- Adding Wide Mouther Frog and modified versions

This commit is contained in:
gijs 2005-05-18 12:17:08 +00:00
parent cbb617b3a1
commit 5ddcbd0fe5
2 changed files with 134 additions and 0 deletions

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# Lowe modified Wide Mouthed Frog
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/wideMouthedFrogLowe.html
#
# Note:
# According to SPORE there are no known attacks on this protocol, scyther
# finds one however this has to do with the unusual assumption that every
# agent can recognise and will reject to read messages that it has created
# itself.
usertype Key;
usertype TimeStamp;
const succ,pred: Function;
inversekeys (succ,pred);
secret k: Function;
protocol wmfLowe(I,R,S)
{
role I
{
const Kir: Key;
const Ti: TimeStamp;
var Kr: Key;
var Nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
read_3(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
send_4(I,R,{{Nr}succ}Kir);
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
}
role R
{
var Ts: TimeStamp;
var Kir: Key;
const Nr: Nonce;
read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
send_3(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
read_4(I,R, {{Nr}succ}Kir);
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
}
role S
{
var Kir: Key;
const Ts: TimeStamp;
var Ti: TimeStamp;
read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
send_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S));
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Ke: Key;
const Te: TimeStamp;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
run wmfLowe.I (Agent,Agent,Simon);
run wmfLowe.R (Agent,Agent,Simon);
run wmfLowe.S (Agent,Agent,Simon);

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# Wide Mouthed Frog
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/wideMouthedFrog.html
#
usertype Key;
usertype TimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
protocol wmf(I,R,S)
{
role I
{
const Kir: Key;
const Ti: TimeStamp;
var Kr: Key;
send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
}
role R
{
var Ts: TimeStamp;
var Kir: Key;
read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
}
role S
{
var Kir: Key;
const Ts: TimeStamp;
var Ti: TimeStamp;
read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
send_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S));
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
const Ke: Key;
const Te: TimeStamp;
untrusted Eve;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
run wmf.I (Agent,Agent,Simon);
run wmf.R (Agent,Agent,Simon);
run wmf.S (Agent,Agent,Simon);