Removed a large number of obsolete files.
This commit is contained in:
Cas Cremers
parent
76c516dee0
commit
4d1e62fac9
@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
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#
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# Scyther Makefile
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#
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#
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# DEBUG or optimization settings: uncomment a single line:
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#
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CFLAGS = -g3 -D DEBUG # default usage, for e.g. with valgrind
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#CFLAGS = -g3 -D DEBUG -pg # for code profiling with gprof
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#CFLAGS = -O3 -static -finline-functions -fomit-frame-pointer
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#
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# Compiler and linkage
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#
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CC = gcc
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# Note that these paths must include the path to the argtable library.
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CPPFLAGS = -I/scratch/ccremers/include -I/usr/local/include -Wall
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LDFLAGS = -L/scratch/ccremers/lib -L/usr/local/lib
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LOADLIBS = -lfl
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LDLIBS = -largtable2
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OPTIONS = ${CPPFLAGS} ${CFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS}
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#
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# Module set for the modelchecker
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#
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MODULES=memory.o terms.o termlists.o symbols.o knowledge.o runs.o modelchecker.o \
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report.o debug.o mgu.o substitutions.o \
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match_basic.o \
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match_clp.o constraints.o \
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output.o latex.o \
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varbuf.o tracebuf.o attackminimize.o \
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tac.o parser.o compiler.o
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#
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# Dependencies
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#
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MODELCHECKER = ${MODULES} main.o
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all: scyther tags
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${Target}.o: ${Target}.c
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$(CC) $(OPTIONS) ${Target}.c -c
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scanner.c: scanner.lex
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flex scanner.lex
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cp lex.yy.c scanner.c
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tok.h: parser.c
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parser.c: parser.y
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bison -d -v parser.y
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cp parser.tab.c parser.c
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cmp -s parser.tab.h tok.h || cp parser.tab.h tok.h
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tags: *.c *.h
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ctags *.c *.h
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modules: $(MODULES)
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scyther: scanner.o $(MODELCHECKER)
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$(CC) $(OPTIONS) $(MODELCHECKER) -o scyther $(LOADLIBS) $(LDLIBS)
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ptestmain.o scanner.o : tok.h
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#
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# Cleanup
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#
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clean:
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rm -f *.o
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rm -f scyther
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rm -f scanner.c
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rm -f parser.c
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rm -f tok.h
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#
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# Clean and rebuild: 'make new'
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#
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new:
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make clean
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make all
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#
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# Make doxygen reference manuals. (in ../refman)
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#
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refman: doxyconfig
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doxygen doxyconfig
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119
src/bugs.txt
119
src/bugs.txt
@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
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--+++ Crititcal Bugs
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* soph segfaults at no switch or -r4 (-r3 is okay??) using non-debug version.
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* './scyther -a ../spdl/nsl3.spdl --increment-runs' segfaults. The main reason is that the Archne engine uses runs in a different way.
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Maybe it is best to disable --increment rules for non-ModelChecker verification.
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---+++ Bugs
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* Problem with goal bindings: instantiation of variable with a tuple might
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introduce a tuple goal, which is forbidden. We must find a way to deal with this. This typically occurs in type flaw searches.
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* Arachne seems to trip over claims with empty prec sets. Maybe we
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simply should not test these.
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* Splice/AS does not work well because priority key search stumbles over the
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public key search stuff. That is a flaw in the heuristic: we should not look
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for anything that is in the intruder knowledge already. In fact, it is a
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problem with branching. We should not look for PK(X), even if X is a
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variable. Priority should go to keys of which the constructor is not in M_0,
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maybe that heuristic works.
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However, there seems to be an infinite loop for this in the algorithm, which
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I did not anticipate. Investigate!
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<br>
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Maybe self-loops are the problem. This has to do with tuple alternation
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decoding. Consider re-introducing explicit intruder strands OR self-loop
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pruning.
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---+++ Would like to have
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---++++ ArachneEngine
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* There is no good test on the correct workings of
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add_goals/destruction of these. We can test this if after
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termination, we have 0 goals; for this we need to store the
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initially added goals as well. Furthermore, we can generate an
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error when <0 goals occur.
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* Consider where in Arachne dependency graph is used. If this is only for
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pruning states, we can construct it there only. However, the base 'role
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defs/bindings' graph might be re-used.
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* Add switch for arachne to prune encryption levels when using -m2.
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* To store attacks for arachne, maybe the following is needed:
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* The roles for each run
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* The variable bindings for all (local) variables
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* The goal bindings
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* Agent terms must have keylevel 0; enforce this!
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* Select_goal should consider, for singular variables, whether their
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type can be found in M_0. If so, the goal can be ignored.
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* Fix 'never sent secrets' list, that are e.g. secret keys of regular agents
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and such. The intruder can never learn these, we need this for pruning.
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If a goal is such a term, we prune. Investigate how this can be incorporated.
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Investigate also whether this actually makes a difference.
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* Make 'generate_trace_bindings' to create the bindings for a given trace.
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Note that there can be multiple solutions; for now, simply try to take the
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shortest one.
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---++++ ModelChecker
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* For secrecy, one trusted agent and one untrusted agent suffices.
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Implement this in the modelchecker.
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* Implement delayed protocol compiler (on run demand only) for the modelchecker?
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---++++ Misc
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* Make different error codes for compilation error/ other error. This can be
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useful for scripts. However, it might shift some constants for the Elegast
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scripts.
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* Rewrite termMguTerm such that it iterates and adapt all functions
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using it. This is to allow for associative tupling later.
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* Fix constants in intruder knowledge. Auto add single one of each type,
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when typed expl. Add single constant when untyped. Fix this also in
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semantics, and add proof to establish sufficiency.
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* Fix function handling (signatures).
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* Move initial intruder knowledge maybe into the title of the MSC.
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* Implement run knowledge, and use this in protocol compiler.
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* Introduce 'Ticket' default type in the compiler, along with some
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handling for that.
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* The 'choose' operator must always be typed, I think. Yes.
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* The woolam-ce is incorrect because it is illegal to have a variable
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term in a key that is read, by CMV semantics. I don't know what it
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means for CE semantics (yet).
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* Idea: run bla.bla(params) [compromised <localterm> [,<localterm>] ];
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1. These local terms are given to the intruder. Technically this
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should only happen _after_ they are first sent in the run. Maybe add
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this to send semantics: if termOccurs(sendterm, compromisedterm) then
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add compromisedterm to M, remove compromisedterm from list of terms to
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compromise.
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1. All claims in the run are ignored (add untrusted flag to run)
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Alternative: run x.x(x) untrusted; or just compromised, to give up
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all constants.
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Note this is not sufficient yet, because it does not consider any
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partner runs. Maybe declare a 'compromised' section first; other runs
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will only activate after these have completed. Note this is much more
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expensive.
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* Woolam-ce gives nothing. But then again, it's a wrong impl.
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* Global/protocol variables should not exist in the current system.
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* run nsl.initiator(alice, all Agent) constructs?
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* 'all' would generate the roles with the corresponding type.
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* or maybe for clarity/complexity control: use 'runs' for constructs
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with 'all' in it.
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* Maybe function application ought to be a different basic term type.
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* After role construction, msc consistency can be checked.
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* Reduce knowledge to a simple term list? That would simplify a number
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of things, and also allow for easier addition of stuff.
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* How is % notation handled in Casper?
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* Vernam encryption?
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---++++ ConstraintLogic (and thus obsolete)
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* CLP: variables in keys must be branched: maybe even in three situations
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(have key and contents, have inverse key and content, nothing)
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* How should claims behave (trusted/untrusted) wrt uninstantiated
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agents? Branch again? That's what is causing the nsl3-var problem.
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* Constraints might be a part of a knowledge thing, because with we
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might now have a number of local knowledge sets, each with their own
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constraint sets. That doesn't make it easier though :( and will cause
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some performance loss I suppose. Each local set has to remain
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solveable as well.
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* Issue: how do untrusted claims work in the context of an intruder?
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Claim must be checked if it can be solved such that at least one of
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the agents is trusted.
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@ -6,13 +6,19 @@ Needed:
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gcc
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If you don't know what this is, please stop reading.
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scons
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A Python script set to replace the make etc. toolchain.
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cmake
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A Makefile generator, available on almost any platform.
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For cross-compilation (Windows):
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[mingw32][universe]
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GCC variant to compile for windows + w32 binutils.
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Use 'scons arch=windows' to generate the binary.
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The best is to simply execute:
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./build.sh
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This should compile everything for your platform and will copy the
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binaries into the correct location.
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@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
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Language
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--------
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language := (<def>)*
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def := (<directive> | <protocol> | <rundef> | <unstrusted>)
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//directive := <dir_require>
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//dir_require := require <filename>;
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protocol := protocol <protocolname> ( <rolelist> ) { <roledef>* } optsc
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protocolname := <id>
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intruderknow := public <termlist>;
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roledef := role <rolename> { <actions> } optsc
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rolename := <id>
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actions := (<action>;)+
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action := (<read> | <send> | <claim>)
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decl := (<const> | <var>)+
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const := const <termlist> [ : <typeterm> ];
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var := var <termlist> [ : <typelist> ];
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read := read [_<label>] (<term>,<term>,<term>);
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send := send [_<label>] (<term>,<term>,<term>);
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claim := claim [_<label>] (<term>,<termlist>);
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label := <id>;
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rundef := <protocolname>.<rolename> ( <instancelist> ) ;
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instancelist := (<agent>|<typeterm>)*
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agent := <term>
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typeterm := <term>
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typelist := <termlist>
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untrusted := untrusted <termlist>;
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termlist := <term> [, <termlist>]
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term := (<baseterm> | <encterm> | <tupleterm> | <function>)
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encterm := { <term> } <term>
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function := <term> ( <term> )
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baseterm := (<variable> | <const>)
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variable := <id>
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const := <id>
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optsc := [ ; ]
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id := (<digit>|<uppercase>|<lowercase>)+
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@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
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- GNU getopt
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- GNU bison/flex
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- de rest (c) Cas
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@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
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- (!!) Are the Arachne rules for keys that are variables sane? E.g. what
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is their inverse key? Check! Intuition: one cannot know what the
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inverse is of a non-instantiated key variable, given the current
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semantics, if asymmetric keys are allowed.
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Consequence: the current implementation is just fine, because
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asymmetric key variables cannot be defined in the language. Thus, the
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rules are fine. Investigate for the other case.
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- If no attack/state output is needed, maybe the attack heuristic should
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be simpler (which means just weighting the trace length etc.) in order
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to avoid uneccesary continuation of the search. Maybe even stop
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altogether after finding *an* attack.
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- For the TimeStamps etc, we can implement an 'auto-leak' of such local
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constants. This should works also with a modifier of sorts (e.g.
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'predictable') and such constants should be leaked to the intruder at
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the start of the run, possibly by prefixing a send.
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- knowledgeAddTerm might be improved by scanning through key list only with
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things that are newly added.
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@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
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// BAN modified version of the yahalom protocol
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// Type flaw
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usertype Server;
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const a,b,c : Agent;
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const s : Server;
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secret k : Function;
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protocol yahalomBan(A,B,S)
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{
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role B
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{
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const nb;
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var na;
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var kab;
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read_!1(A,B, A,na,B,S);
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send_!2(B,S, B,nb, {A,na}k(B,S) );
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read_!4(A,B, {A,kab,nb}k(B,S) , {nb}kab );
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claim_6(B, Secret,kab);
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}
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}
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24
src/todo.txt
24
src/todo.txt
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cumbersome and might impact on performance. Alternatively, iterators
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can be implemented as macros, which is probably the fastest, but maybe
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less readable.
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- --check is slightly f***ed up because there is no good semantics for
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the --disable intruder check. As a result, it is now too strict can
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cause correct protocols to fail. Fix.
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- The (currently not advised) switch --check is slightly off because
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there is no good semantics for the --disable intruder check. As a
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result, it is now too strict can cause correct protocols to fail. Fix.
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- When *not* asking for attack output, maybe we should default to
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--prune = 1. Then, if we ask for --xml output or --dot, we do:
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if --prune == 1 then --prune == 2 now :) unless otherwise specified.
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@ -52,3 +52,21 @@
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- SConstruct file should check whether ctags actually exists (avoiding
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errors)
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- Proof output should be XML, with an external converter to dot format.
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- Are the Arachne rules for keys that are variables sufficiently sane in
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general? E.g. what is their inverse key? Intuition: one cannot know
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what the inverse is of a non-instantiated key variable, given the
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current semantics, if asymmetric keys are allowed. Consequence: the
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current implementation is just fine, because asymmetric key variables
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cannot be defined in the language. Thus, the rules are fine.
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Investigate for future extensions what the consequences of this are.
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- If no attack/state output is needed, maybe the attack heuristic should
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be simpler (which means just weighting the trace length etc.) in order
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to avoid uneccesary continuation of the search. Maybe even stop
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altogether after finding *an* attack.
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- For the TimeStamps etc, we can implement an 'auto-leak' of such local
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constants. This should works also with a modifier of sorts (e.g.
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'predictable') and such constants should be leaked to the intruder at
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the start of the run, possibly by prefixing a send.
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- knowledgeAddTerm might be improved by scanning through key list only with
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things that are newly added.
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