- Add freshness claims to the protocols that should guarantee freshness
This commit is contained in:
parent
464920907b
commit
4c224dc6f4
@ -18,17 +18,21 @@
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usertype SessionKey;
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usertype SessionKey;
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secret k: Function;
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secret k: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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protocol andrewConcrete(I,R,X)
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protocol swapkey(X)
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{
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{
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# Protocol added to work around the symmetry problems where k(I,R) != k(R,I)
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# Role added to work around the symmetry problems where k(I,R) != k(R,I)
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role X
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role X
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{
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{
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var T: Ticket;
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var I,R: Agent;
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read_X1(X,X, {T}k(I,R));
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var T:Ticket;
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send_X2(X,X, {T}k(R,I));
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read_X1(X,X,I,R,{T}k(I,R));
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send_X2(X,X,{T}k(R,I));
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}
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}
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}
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protocol andrewConcrete(I,R)
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{
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role I
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role I
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{
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{
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@ -39,8 +43,9 @@ protocol andrewConcrete(I,R,X)
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send_1(I,R, I,ni );
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send_1(I,R, I,ni );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
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send_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
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claim_4(I,Secret,kir);
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claim_I1(I,Secret,kir);
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claim_5(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I3(I,Empty,(Fresh,kir));
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read_6(R,I, nr);
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read_6(R,I, nr);
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}
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}
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@ -54,8 +59,9 @@ protocol andrewConcrete(I,R,X)
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send_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
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read_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
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send_6(R,I, nr);
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send_6(R,I, nr);
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claim_7(R,Secret,kir);
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claim_R1(R,Secret,kir);
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claim_8(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R3(R,Empty,(Fresh,kir));
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}
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}
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}
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}
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@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
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#
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#
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usertype SessionKey;
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usertype SessionKey;
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secret k: Function;
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secret k: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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protocol andrewBan(I,R)
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protocol andrewBan(I,R)
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{
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{
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@ -26,10 +27,11 @@ protocol andrewBan(I,R)
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
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read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
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read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
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claim_5(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I1(I,Nisynch);
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claim_5b(I,Niagree);
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claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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claim_6(I,Secret, kir);
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claim_I3(I,Secret, kir);
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claim_7(I,Secret, k(I,R));
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claim_I4(I,Secret, k(I,R));
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claim_I5(I,Empty, (Fresh,kir));
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}
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}
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role R
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role R
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@ -42,10 +44,11 @@ protocol andrewBan(I,R)
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
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send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
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send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
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claim_8(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
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claim_8b(R,Niagree);
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claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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claim_9(R,Secret, kir);
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claim_R3(R,Secret, kir);
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claim_10(R,Secret, k(I,R));
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claim_R4(R,Secret, k(I,R));
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claim_R5(R,Empty, (Fresh,kir));
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}
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}
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}
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}
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@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
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usertype SessionKey;
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usertype SessionKey;
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secret k: Function;
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secret k: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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protocol andrewLoweBan(I,R)
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protocol andrewLoweBan(I,R)
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{
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{
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@ -32,8 +33,9 @@ protocol andrewLoweBan(I,R)
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send_1(I,R, I,ni );
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send_1(I,R, I,ni );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
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send_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
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claim_5(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I1(I,Nisynch);
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claim_6(I,Secret, kir);
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claim_I2(I,Secret, kir);
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claim_I3(I,Empty, (Fresh,kir));
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read_4(R,I, nr );
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read_4(R,I, nr );
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}
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}
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@ -47,8 +49,9 @@ protocol andrewLoweBan(I,R)
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send_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
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read_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
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send_4(R,I, nr );
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send_4(R,I, nr );
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claim_8(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
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claim_9(R,Secret, kir);
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claim_R2(R,Secret, kir);
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claim_R3(R,Empty, (Fresh,kir));
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}
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}
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}
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}
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@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
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usertype SessionKey;
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usertype SessionKey;
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secret k: Function;
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secret k: Function;
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const succ: Function;
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const succ: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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protocol andrew(I,R)
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protocol andrew(I,R)
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{
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{
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@ -25,8 +26,10 @@ protocol andrew(I,R)
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read_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
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read_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
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read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
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read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
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claim_5(I,Secret,kir);
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claim_I1(I,Secret,kir);
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claim_6(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I3(I,Niagree);
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claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,kir));
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}
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}
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role R
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role R
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@ -39,8 +42,10 @@ protocol andrew(I,R)
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send_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
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send_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
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send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
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send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
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claim_7(R,Secret,kir);
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claim_R1(R,Secret,kir);
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claim_8(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R3(R,Niagree);
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claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,kir));
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}
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}
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}
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}
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@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ usertype TimeStamp;
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secret k: Function;
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secret k: Function;
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usertype PseudoFunction;
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usertype PseudoFunction;
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const dec: PseudoFunction;
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const dec: PseudoFunction;
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const Fresh: Function;
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protocol denningSaccoLowe(I,R,S)
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protocol denningSaccoLowe(I,R,S)
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{
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{
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@ -32,7 +33,10 @@ protocol denningSaccoLowe(I,R,S)
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send_3(I,R, W);
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send_3(I,R, W);
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read_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
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read_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
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send_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
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send_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
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claim_6(I,Niagree);
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claim_I1(I,Niagree);
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claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I3(I,Secret,Kir);
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claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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}
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}
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role R
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role R
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@ -44,7 +48,10 @@ protocol denningSaccoLowe(I,R,S)
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read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
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read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
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send_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
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send_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
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read_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
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read_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
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claim_8(R,Niagree);
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claim_R1(R,Niagree);
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claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R3(R,Secret,Kir);
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claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
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}
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}
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role S
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role S
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@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ usertype Key;
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usertype SessionKey;
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usertype SessionKey;
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usertype TimeStamp;
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usertype TimeStamp;
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secret k: Function;
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secret k: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
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protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
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{
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{
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@ -26,6 +27,8 @@ protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
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send_3(I,R, W);
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send_3(I,R, W);
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claim_I1(I,Niagree);
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claim_I1(I,Niagree);
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claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I3(I,Secret,Kir);
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claim_I4(I,Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
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}
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}
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role R
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role R
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@ -36,7 +39,8 @@ protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
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read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
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read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
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claim_R1(R,Niagree);
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claim_R1(R,Niagree);
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claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R3(R,Secret,Kir);
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claim_R4(R,Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
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}
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}
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role S
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role S
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@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
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usertype Sessionkey;
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usertype Sessionkey;
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secret k: Function;
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secret k: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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protocol kaochow2(I,R,S)
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protocol kaochow2(I,R,S)
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{
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{
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@ -23,9 +24,10 @@ protocol kaochow2(I,R,S)
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read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr );
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read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr );
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send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
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send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
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claim_5 (I, Nisynch);
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claim_I1 (I, Nisynch);
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claim_6 (I, Niagree);
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claim_I2 (I, Niagree);
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claim_7 (I, Secret, kir);
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claim_I3 (I, Secret, kir);
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claim_I4 (I, Empty, (Fresh,kir));
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}
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}
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role R
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role R
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@ -39,9 +41,10 @@ protocol kaochow2(I,R,S)
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send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr );
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send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr );
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read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
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read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
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claim_8 (R, Nisynch);
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claim_R1 (R, Nisynch);
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claim_9 (R, Niagree);
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claim_R2 (R, Niagree);
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claim_10 (R, Secret, kir);
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claim_R3 (R, Secret, kir);
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claim_R4 (R, Empty, (Fresh,kir));
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}
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}
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role S
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role S
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
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usertype Sessionkey;
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usertype Sessionkey;
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usertype Timestamp;
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usertype Timestamp;
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secret k: Function;
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secret k: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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protocol kaochow3(I,R,S)
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protocol kaochow3(I,R,S)
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{
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{
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@ -25,9 +26,10 @@ protocol kaochow3(I,R,S)
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read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 );
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read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 );
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send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, T2 );
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send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, T2 );
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claim_5 (I, Nisynch);
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claim_I1 (I, Nisynch);
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claim_6 (I, Niagree);
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claim_I2 (I, Niagree);
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claim_7 (I, Secret, kir);
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claim_I3 (I, Secret, kir);
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claim_I4 (I, Empty, (Fresh,kir));
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}
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}
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role R
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role R
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@ -42,9 +44,10 @@ protocol kaochow3(I,R,S)
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send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
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send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
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read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
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read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
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claim_8 (R, Nisynch);
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claim_R1 (R, Nisynch);
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claim_9 (R, Niagree);
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claim_R2 (R, Niagree);
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claim_10 (R, Secret, kir);
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claim_R3 (R, Secret, kir);
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claim_R4 (R, Empty, (Fresh,kir));
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}
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}
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role S
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role S
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usertype Sessionkey;
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usertype Sessionkey;
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secret k: Function;
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secret k: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
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protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
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{
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{
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@ -23,9 +24,10 @@ protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
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read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), {ni}kir, nr );
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read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), {ni}kir, nr );
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send_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
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send_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
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claim_5 (I, Nisynch);
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claim_I1 (I, Nisynch);
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claim_6 (I, Niagree);
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claim_I2 (I, Niagree);
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claim_7 (I, Secret, kir);
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claim_I3 (I, Secret, kir);
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claim_I4 (I, Empty, (Fresh,kir));
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}
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}
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role R
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role R
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@ -39,9 +41,10 @@ protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
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send_3 (R,I, T, {ni}kir, nr );
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send_3 (R,I, T, {ni}kir, nr );
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read_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
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read_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
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claim_8 (R, Nisynch);
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claim_R1 (R, Nisynch);
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claim_9 (R, Niagree);
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claim_R2 (R, Niagree);
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claim_10 (R, Secret, kir);
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claim_R3 (R, Secret, kir);
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||||||
|
claim_R4 (R, Empty, (Fresh,kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ secret k: Function;
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
const a, b, e: Agent;
|
const a, b, e: Agent;
|
||||||
const s: Server;
|
const s: Server;
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const ne: Nonce;
|
const ne: Nonce;
|
||||||
@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ protocol kslLowe(A,B,S)
|
|||||||
claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
|
claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
|
||||||
claim_A2(A,Niagree);
|
claim_A2(A,Niagree);
|
||||||
claim_A3(A,Nisynch);
|
claim_A3(A,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_A4(A,Empty, (Fresh,Kab));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role B
|
role B
|
||||||
@ -67,6 +69,7 @@ protocol kslLowe(A,B,S)
|
|||||||
claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab);
|
claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab);
|
||||||
claim_B2(B,Niagree);
|
claim_B2(B,Niagree);
|
||||||
claim_B3(B,Nisynch);
|
claim_B3(B,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_B4(B,Empty, (Fresh,Kab));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ secret k: Function;
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
const a, b, e: Agent;
|
const a, b, e: Agent;
|
||||||
const s: Server;
|
const s: Server;
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const ne: Nonce;
|
const ne: Nonce;
|
||||||
const kee: SessionKey;
|
const kee: SessionKey;
|
||||||
@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ protocol ksl(A,B,S)
|
|||||||
claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
|
claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
|
||||||
claim_A2(A,Niagree);
|
claim_A2(A,Niagree);
|
||||||
claim_A3(A,Nisynch);
|
claim_A3(A,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_A4(A,Empty, (Fresh, Kab));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role B
|
role B
|
||||||
@ -64,6 +66,7 @@ protocol ksl(A,B,S)
|
|||||||
claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab);
|
claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab);
|
||||||
claim_B2(B,Niagree);
|
claim_B2(B,Niagree);
|
||||||
claim_B3(B,Nisynch);
|
claim_B3(B,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_B4(B,Empty,(Fresh,Kab));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ secret k: Function;
|
|||||||
const dec,inc: Function;
|
const dec,inc: Function;
|
||||||
inversekeys(dec,inc);
|
inversekeys(dec,inc);
|
||||||
usertype SessionKey;
|
usertype SessionKey;
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
protocol needhamschroederskamend(I,R,S)
|
protocol needhamschroederskamend(I,R,S)
|
||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
@ -39,6 +40,7 @@ protocol needhamschroederskamend(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir);
|
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role R
|
role R
|
||||||
@ -53,6 +55,7 @@ protocol needhamschroederskamend(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
read_7(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
read_7(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Nr);
|
claim_R1(R,Secret,Nr);
|
||||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ secret k: Function;
|
|||||||
const dec,inc: Function;
|
const dec,inc: Function;
|
||||||
inversekeys(dec,inc);
|
inversekeys(dec,inc);
|
||||||
usertype SessionKey;
|
usertype SessionKey;
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
|
protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
|
||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
send_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
send_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir);
|
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role R
|
role R
|
||||||
@ -44,6 +46,7 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
read_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
read_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ secret k: Function;
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
const a, b, e: Agent;
|
const a, b, e: Agent;
|
||||||
const s: Server;
|
const s: Server;
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const ne: Nonce;
|
const ne: Nonce;
|
||||||
const kee: SessionKey;
|
const kee: SessionKey;
|
||||||
@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ protocol neustubHwang(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||||
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
|
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
|
||||||
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role R
|
role R
|
||||||
@ -63,6 +65,7 @@ protocol neustubHwang(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ secret k: Function;
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
const a, b, e: Agent;
|
const a, b, e: Agent;
|
||||||
const s: Server;
|
const s: Server;
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const ne: Nonce;
|
const ne: Nonce;
|
||||||
const kee: SessionKey;
|
const kee: SessionKey;
|
||||||
@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||||
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
|
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
|
||||||
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role R
|
role R
|
||||||
@ -60,6 +62,7 @@ protocol neustub(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
secret const k : Function;
|
secret const k : Function;
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
usertype String,SessionKey;
|
usertype String,SessionKey;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -26,7 +27,8 @@ protocol otwayrees(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
read_4(R,I, M,{Ni,Kir}k(I,S) );
|
read_4(R,I, M,{Ni,Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
#claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_I3(I, Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role R
|
role R
|
||||||
@ -42,7 +44,8 @@ protocol otwayrees(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
send_4(R,I, M, T2 );
|
send_4(R,I, M, T2 );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
#claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_R3(R, Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -3,12 +3,16 @@
|
|||||||
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
|
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
|
||||||
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/tmn.html
|
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/tmn.html
|
||||||
#
|
#
|
||||||
|
# Note:
|
||||||
|
# According to Boyd and Mathuria Kb is the session key this is not clear
|
||||||
|
# from the description in SPORE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
usertype Key;
|
usertype Key;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
const pk: Function;
|
const pk: Function;
|
||||||
secret sk: Function;
|
secret sk: Function;
|
||||||
inversekeys(pk,sk);
|
inversekeys(pk,sk);
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
protocol tmn(I,R,S)
|
protocol tmn(I,R,S)
|
||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
@ -20,8 +24,9 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
send_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
|
send_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
|
||||||
read_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
|
read_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Ki);
|
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kr);
|
||||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kr);
|
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_I3(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kr));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role R
|
role R
|
||||||
@ -32,6 +37,8 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
send_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
|
send_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kr);
|
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kr);
|
||||||
|
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_R3(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kr));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ usertype Key;
|
|||||||
usertype TimeStamp;
|
usertype TimeStamp;
|
||||||
const succ,pred: Function;
|
const succ,pred: Function;
|
||||||
inversekeys (succ,pred);
|
inversekeys (succ,pred);
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
secret k: Function;
|
secret k: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ protocol wmfLowe(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_I3(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role R
|
role R
|
||||||
@ -45,6 +47,7 @@ protocol wmfLowe(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_R3(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ usertype Key;
|
|||||||
usertype TimeStamp;
|
usertype TimeStamp;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
secret k: Function;
|
secret k: Function;
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
protocol wmf(I,R,S)
|
protocol wmf(I,R,S)
|
||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
|
send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
|
claim_I2(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role R
|
role R
|
||||||
@ -31,6 +33,7 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_R3(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
|
|||||||
usertype Key;
|
usertype Key;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
secret k: Function;
|
secret k: Function;
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
protocol woolam(I,R,S)
|
protocol woolam(I,R,S)
|
||||||
{
|
{
|
||||||
@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_I3(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role R
|
role R
|
||||||
@ -49,6 +51,7 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_R3(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
|
|||||||
secret k : Function;
|
secret k : Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
usertype Key;
|
usertype Key;
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
protocol yahalomBAN(I,R,S)
|
protocol yahalomBAN(I,R,S)
|
||||||
@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ protocol yahalomBAN(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_I3(I, Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role R
|
role R
|
||||||
@ -43,6 +45,7 @@ protocol yahalomBAN(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_R3(R, Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
|
|||||||
#
|
#
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
secret k : Function;
|
secret k : Function;
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
usertype Key;
|
usertype Key;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ protocol yahalomPaulson(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_I3(I, Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role R
|
role R
|
||||||
@ -43,6 +45,7 @@ protocol yahalomPaulson(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_R3(R, Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
|
|||||||
secret k : Function;
|
secret k : Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
usertype Key;
|
usertype Key;
|
||||||
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
|
protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
|
||||||
@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_I3(I, Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role R
|
role R
|
||||||
@ -43,6 +45,7 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||||
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||||
|
claim_R3(R, Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
role S
|
role S
|
||||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user