- Use variable type SessionKey every where instead of a combination
between Key and SessionKey - Make KSL working again
This commit is contained in:
parent
eef9072324
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49cd9b1271
@ -12,14 +12,15 @@
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usertype Server, SessionKey, GeneralizedTimestamp, TicketKey;
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secret k: Function;
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const Alice, Bob, Simon, Eve: Agent;
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const a, b, e: Agent;
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const s: Server;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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const ne: Nonce;
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const kee: SessionKey;
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untrusted Eve;
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compromised k(Eve,Simon);
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untrusted e;
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compromised k(e,s);
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protocol kslSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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{
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@ -36,7 +37,7 @@ protocol kslSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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send_C2(C,C, (Ni,I),
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(Ni,I,Nr,R),
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{Nr,I,Kir}k(R,S),{Ni,R,Kir}k(I,S),
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{Tr,I,Kir}Kbb,Nc,{Ni}Kir,
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{Tr,I,Kir}Kbb,Nc,{Ni}k(I,R),
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{Nc}Kir,
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Ma,
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Mb,{Ma}Kir,
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@ -50,34 +51,34 @@ protocol kslSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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}
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protocol ksl(I,R,S)
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protocol ksl(A,B,S)
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{
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role I
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role A
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{
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const Ni, Mi: Nonce;
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var Nr2, Mr: Nonce;
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const Na, Ma: Nonce;
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var Nc, Mb: Nonce;
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var T: Ticket;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var Kab: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, Ni, I);
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read_4(R,I, {Ni,R,Kir}k(I,S), T, Nr2, {Ni}Kir);
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send_5(I,R, {Nr2}Kir );
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send_1(A,B, Na, A);
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read_4(B,A, { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S), T, Nc, {Na}Kab );
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send_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
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send_6(I,R, Mi,T );
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read_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi}Kir );
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send_8(I,R, {Mr}Kir );
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send_6(A,B, Ma,T );
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read_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma}Kab );
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send_8(A,B, {Mb}Kab );
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claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
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claim_A2(A,Niagree);
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claim_A3(A,Nisynch);
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claim_A4(A,Empty, (Fresh, Kab));
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claim_I1(A,Secret, Kab);
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claim_I2(A,Niagree);
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claim_I3(A,Nisynch);
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claim_I4(A,Empty, (Fresh, Kab));
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}
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role B
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{
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var Na,Ma: Nonce;
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const Nr,Nr2,Mr: Nonce;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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const Nb,Nc,Mb: Nonce;
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var Kab: SessionKey;
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const Kbb: TicketKey;
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const Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp;
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var T: Ticket;
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@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ protocol ksl(I,R,S)
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}
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}
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run ksl.A(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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run ksl.B(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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run ksl.S(Alice,Bob,Simon);
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run ksl.A(a,b,s);
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run ksl.B(a,b,s);
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run ksl.S(a,b,s);
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@ -6,8 +6,7 @@
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# Note:
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# According to Boyd and Mathuria Kb is the session key this is not clear
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# from the description in SPORE
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usertype Key;
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usertype SessionKey;
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const pk: Function;
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secret sk: Function;
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@ -21,7 +20,7 @@ protocol tmnSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
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role C {
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const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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const Kr,Ki: Key;
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const Kr,Ki: SessionKey;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
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@ -38,8 +37,8 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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const Ki: Key;
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var Kr: Key;
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const Ki: SessionKey;
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var Kr: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
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read_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
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@ -51,7 +50,7 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
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role R
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{
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const Kr: Key;
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const Kr: SessionKey;
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read_2(S,R, I );
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send_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
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@ -63,7 +62,7 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
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role S
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{
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var Ki,Kr: Key;
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var Ki,Kr: SessionKey;
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read_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
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send_2(S,R, I );
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@ -73,7 +72,7 @@ protocol tmn(I,R,S)
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
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const Ke: Key;
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const Ke: SessionKey;
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untrusted Eve;
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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
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# agent can recognise and will reject to read messages that it has created
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# itself.
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usertype Key;
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usertype SessionKey;
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usertype TimeStamp;
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const succ,pred: Function;
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inversekeys (succ,pred);
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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ protocol wmfLoweSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
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role C {
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const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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const Kir: Key;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const Ti,Ts: TimeStamp;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ protocol wmfLowe(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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const Kir: Key;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const Ti: TimeStamp;
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var Kr: Key;
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var Kr: SessionKey;
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var Nr: Nonce;
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send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
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@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ protocol wmfLowe(I,R,S)
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role R
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{
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var Ts: TimeStamp;
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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const Nr: Nonce;
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read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
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@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ protocol wmfLowe(I,R,S)
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role S
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{
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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const Ts: TimeStamp;
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var Ti: TimeStamp;
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@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ protocol wmfLowe(I,R,S)
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
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const Ke: Key;
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const Ke: SessionKey;
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const Te: TimeStamp;
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/wideMouthedFrog.html
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#
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usertype Key;
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usertype SessionKey;
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usertype TimeStamp;
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secret k: Function;
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ protocol wmfSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
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role C {
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const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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const Kir: Key;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const Ti,Ts: TimeStamp;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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const Kir: Key;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const Ti: TimeStamp;
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var Kr: Key;
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var Kr: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
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@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
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role R
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{
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var Ts: TimeStamp;
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
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@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
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role S
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{
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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const Ts: TimeStamp;
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var Ti: TimeStamp;
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@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ protocol wmf(I,R,S)
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
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const Ke: Key;
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const Ke: SessionKey;
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const Te: TimeStamp;
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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
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#
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usertype Key;
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usertype SessionKey;
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secret k: Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ protocol woolamSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
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role C {
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const N1,N2: Nonce;
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const Kir: Key;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
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@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
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role I
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{
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const N1: Nonce;
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var N2: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, I, N1);
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@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
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{
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const N2: Nonce;
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var N1: Nonce;
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var T1,T2: Ticket;
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read_1(I,R, I, N1);
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@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
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role S
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{
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const Kir: Key;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var N1,N2: Nonce;
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read_4(R,S, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S), {I, R, N1, N2}k(R,S));
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@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
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const Ke: Key;
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const Ke: SessionKey;
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const Te: Ticket;
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const Ne: Nonce;
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
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secret k : Function;
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usertype Key;
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usertype SessionKey;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ protocol yahalomBANSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
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role C {
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const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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const Kir: Key;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
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@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ protocol yahalomBAN(I,R,S)
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const Ni: Nonce;
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var Nr: Nonce;
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var T: Ticket;
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
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read_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T );
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@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ protocol yahalomBAN(I,R,S)
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const Nr: Nonce;
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var Ni: Nonce;
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var T: Ticket;
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
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send_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
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@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ protocol yahalomBAN(I,R,S)
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role S
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{
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const Kir: Key;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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read_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
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secret k : Function;
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usertype Key;
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usertype SessionKey;
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protocol yahalomLowe(I,R,S)
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ protocol yahalomLowe(I,R,S)
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{
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const Ni: Nonce;
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var Nr: Nonce;
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
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read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S) );
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@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ protocol yahalomLowe(I,R,S)
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{
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const Nr: Nonce;
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var Ni: Nonce;
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
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send_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
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@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ protocol yahalomLowe(I,R,S)
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role S
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{
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const Kir: Key;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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read_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ secret k : Function;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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usertype Key;
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usertype SessionKey;
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protocol yahalomPaulsonSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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{
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ protocol yahalomPaulsonSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
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role C {
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const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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const Kir: Key;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
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@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ protocol yahalomPaulson(I,R,S)
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const Ni: Nonce;
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var Nr: Nonce;
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var T: Ticket;
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
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read_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T );
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@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ protocol yahalomPaulson(I,R,S)
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const Nr: Nonce;
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var Ni: Nonce;
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var T: Ticket;
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
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send_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
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@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ protocol yahalomPaulson(I,R,S)
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role S
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{
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const Kir: Key;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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read_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
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secret k : Function;
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usertype Key;
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usertype SessionKey;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ protocol yahalomSessionKeyCompromise(C)
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// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
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role C {
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const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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const Kir: Key;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
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@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
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const Ni: Nonce;
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var Nr: Nonce;
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var T: Ticket;
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
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read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), T );
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@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
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const Nr: Nonce;
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var Ni: Nonce;
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var T: Ticket;
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var Kir: Key;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
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send_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
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@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
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role S
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{
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const Kir: Key;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
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read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
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