- Adding Kao Chow
- Adding Dennig Sacco - Updated not modelled file to include DH, GJM and Gong
This commit is contained in:
gijs
parent
924abc065d
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489e8394b0
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@ -4,3 +4,15 @@ The following protocols have not been modelled for use in Scyther:
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This protocol only consists of one message and corresponding database actions.
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The description given in SPORE is unsuitable for formalisation.
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- Diffie Helman http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/diffieHelman.html
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This protocol relies on algebraic properties that can not be modelled in
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scyther.
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- GJM http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/gjm.html
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This protocol contains complicated if-then-else constructions that can
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not be modelled in scyther.
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- Gong http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/gong.html
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This protocol relies on algebraic properties that can not be modelled in
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scyther.
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80
spdl/SPORE/denning-sacco-lowe.spdl
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80
spdl/SPORE/denning-sacco-lowe.spdl
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@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
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# Lowe modified Denning-Sacco shared key
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/denningSaccoLowe.html
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#
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# Note:
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a) and type 2 matching (-m2)
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#
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# Note:
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# According to SPORE there are no attacks on this protocol, scyther
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# finds one however. This has to be investigated further.
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usertype Key;
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usertype Ticket;
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usertype SessionKey;
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usertype TimeStamp;
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secret k: Function;
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usertype PseudoFunction;
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const dec: PseudoFunction;
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protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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var W: Ticket;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var T: TimeStamp;
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var Nr: Nonce;
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send_1(I,S, I,R );
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read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
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send_3(I,R, W);
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read_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
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send_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
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claim_6(I,Niagree);
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}
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role R
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{
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var T: TimeStamp;
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const Nr: Nonce;
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read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
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send_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
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read_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
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claim_8(R,Niagree);
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}
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role S
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{
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var W: Ticket;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const T: TimeStamp;
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read_1(I,S, I,R );
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send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const kee: SessionKey;
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const tee: TimeStamp;
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compromised k(Eve,Simon);
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# General scenario, 2 parallel runs of the protocol
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# Note because the modelchecker does not support tickets this might not
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# be very useful
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run denningSacco.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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69
spdl/SPORE/denning-sacco.spdl
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69
spdl/SPORE/denning-sacco.spdl
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@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
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# Denning-Sacco shared key
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/denningSacco.html
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#
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# Note:
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a) and type 2 matching (-m2)
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#
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usertype Key;
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usertype Ticket;
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usertype SessionKey;
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usertype TimeStamp;
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secret k: Function;
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protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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var W: Ticket;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var T: TimeStamp;
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send_1(I,S, I,R );
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read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
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send_3(I,R, W);
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claim_4(I,Nisynch);
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}
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role R
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{
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var T: TimeStamp;
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read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
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claim_8(R,Nisynch);
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}
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role S
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{
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var W: Ticket;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const T: TimeStamp;
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read_1(I,S, I,R );
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send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const kee: SessionKey;
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const tee: TimeStamp;
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compromised k(Eve,Simon);
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# General scenario, 2 parallel runs of the protocol
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# Note because the modelchecker does not support tickets this might not
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# be very useful
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run denningSacco.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run denningSacco.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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77
spdl/SPORE/kaochow-v2.spdl
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77
spdl/SPORE/kaochow-v2.spdl
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@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
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# Kao Chow Authentication v.2
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/kaoChow2.html
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#
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# Note:
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a) and type 2 matching (-m2)
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#
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usertype Sessionkey;
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usertype Ticket;
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secret k: Function;
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protocol kaochow2(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
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send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
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read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr );
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send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
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claim_5 (I, Nisynch);
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claim_6 (I, Niagree);
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claim_7 (I, Secret, kir);
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
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var T: Ticket;
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read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
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send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr );
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read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
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claim_8 (R, Nisynch);
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claim_9 (R, Niagree);
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claim_10 (R, Secret, kir);
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}
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role S
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const kir, kt: Sessionkey;
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read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
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send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const ne: Nonce;
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const te: Ticket;
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const ke: Sessionkey;
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compromised k(Eve,Eve);
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compromised k(Eve,Alice);
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compromised k(Eve,Bob);
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compromised k(Eve,Simon);
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compromised k(Alice,Eve);
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compromised k(Bob,Eve);
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compromised k(Simon,Eve);
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run kaochow2.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow2.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow2.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow2.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow2.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow2.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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80
spdl/SPORE/kaochow-v3.spdl
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80
spdl/SPORE/kaochow-v3.spdl
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# Kao Chow Authentication v.3
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/kaoChow3.html
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#
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# Note:
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a) and type 2 matching (-m2)
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#
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usertype Sessionkey;
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usertype Ticket;
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usertype Timestamp;
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secret k: Function;
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protocol kaochow3(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
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var T2: Ticket;
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send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
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read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 );
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send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, T2 );
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claim_5 (I, Nisynch);
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claim_6 (I, Niagree);
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claim_7 (I, Secret, kir);
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
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var T: Ticket;
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const tr: Timestamp;
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read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
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send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
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read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
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claim_8 (R, Nisynch);
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claim_9 (R, Niagree);
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claim_10 (R, Secret, kir);
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}
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role S
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const kir, kt: Sessionkey;
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read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
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send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const ne: Nonce;
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const te: Ticket;
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const ke: Sessionkey;
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compromised k(Eve,Eve);
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compromised k(Eve,Alice);
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compromised k(Eve,Bob);
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compromised k(Eve,Simon);
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compromised k(Alice,Eve);
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compromised k(Bob,Eve);
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compromised k(Simon,Eve);
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run kaochow3.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow3.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow3.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow3.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow3.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow3.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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77
spdl/SPORE/kaochow.spdl
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77
spdl/SPORE/kaochow.spdl
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@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
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# Kao Chow Authentication v.1
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/kaoChow1.html
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#
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# Note:
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a) and type 2 matching (-m2)
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#
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usertype Sessionkey;
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usertype Ticket;
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secret k: Function;
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protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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var kir: Sessionkey;
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send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
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read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), {ni}kir, nr );
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send_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
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claim_5 (I, Nisynch);
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claim_6 (I, Niagree);
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claim_7 (I, Secret, kir);
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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var kir: Sessionkey;
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var T;
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read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );
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send_3 (R,I, T, {ni}kir, nr );
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read_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
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claim_8 (R, Nisynch);
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claim_9 (R, Niagree);
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claim_10 (R, Secret, kir);
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}
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role S
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const kir: Sessionkey;
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read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
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send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const ne: Nonce;
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const te: Ticket;
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const ke: Sessionkey;
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compromised k(Eve,Eve);
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compromised k(Eve,Alice);
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compromised k(Eve,Bob);
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compromised k(Eve,Simon);
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compromised k(Alice,Eve);
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compromised k(Bob,Eve);
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compromised k(Simon,Eve);
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run kaochow.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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run kaochow.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
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