andr3/scyther
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

- Updated many protocols according to the tests.

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
ccremers 2004-10-18 13:45:58 +00:00
parent 70d076644d
commit 3ee392ca08
20 changed files with 74 additions and 89 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

3
spdl/bkepk-ce.spdl
View File

@ -40,13 +40,14 @@ protocol bkepk(A,B,testnonce)
{
var n: Nonce;
read_4 (A,A, n);
read_4 (testnonce,testnonce, n);
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);
untrusted Eve;
run bkepk.A(Alice,Bob,Alice);

25
spdl/bkepk-ce2.spdl
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
Bilateral Key Exchange with Public Key protocol (BKEPK)
Bilateral Key Exchange with Public Key protocol (bkepkCE2)
Version from Corin/Etalle: An Improved Constraint-Based System for the Verification of Security Protocols.
Tried to stay as close as possible to compare timing results.
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
protocol bkepk(A,B,testnonce)
protocol bkepkCE2(A,B,testnonce)
{
role B
{
@ -40,22 +40,23 @@ protocol bkepk(A,B,testnonce)
{
var n: Nonce;
read_4 (A,A, n);
read_4 (testnonce,testnonce, n);
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);
untrusted Eve;
run bkepk.A(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepk.A(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepk.A(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepk.B(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepk.B(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepk.B(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepkCE2.A(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepkCE2.A(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepkCE2.A(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepkCE2.B(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepkCE2.B(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepkCE2.B(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepk.testnonce(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepk.testnonce(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepk.testnonce(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepkCE2.testnonce(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepkCE2.testnonce(Alice,Bob,Alice);
run bkepkCE2.testnonce(Alice,Bob,Alice);

2
spdl/broken1.spdl
View File

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ protocol broken1(I,R,S)
{
read_3(S, R, {HelloWorld, S, I, R}k );
read_1(I, R, PlainSight, {HelloWorld, I, R}k );
claim(R, Secret, PlainSight);
claim_4(R, Secret, PlainSight);
}
role S
{

1
spdl/carkey-broken-limited.spdl
View File

@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ protocol carkeybroken(I,R)
const ni: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, I,R );
claim_3(I,Nisynch);
}
role R

1
spdl/carkey-broken.spdl
View File

@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ protocol carkeybroken(I,R)
const ni: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {ni}sk(I) );
claim_3(I,Nisynch);
}
role R

1
spdl/carkey-ni.spdl
View File

@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ protocol carkeyni(I,R)
const ni: Nonce;
send_1(I,R, {R,ni}sk(I) );
claim_3(I,Nisynch);
}
role R

1
spdl/carkey-ni2.spdl
View File

@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ protocol carkeyni(I,R)
send_1(I,R, {R,ni}sk(I) );
send_2(I,R, {R,ni}sk(I) );
claim_5(I,Nisynch);
}
role R

33
spdl/five-run-bound.spdl
View File

@ -4,20 +4,6 @@ inversekeys (pk,sk);
protocol r5bound(I,R)
{
role I
{
const k1: Nonce;
const ni: Nonce;
var k2: Nonce;
send_1 (I,R, ni );
read_2 (R,I, { ni }sk(R) );
send_3 (I,R, {{{ {k1}pk(R) }sk(I)}sk(I)}sk(I) );
read_4 (R,I, {k2}k1 );
claim_5 (I, Secret, k2);
}
role R
{
var k1: Nonce;
@ -34,18 +20,13 @@ protocol r5bound(I,R)
}
const Alice, Bob: Agent;
const ne: Nonce;
run r5bound.I(Agent,Agent);
run r5bound.R(Agent,Agent);
run r5bound.I(Agent,Agent);
run r5bound.R(Agent,Agent);
run r5bound.R(Agent);
run r5bound.R(Agent);
run r5bound.I(Agent,Agent);
run r5bound.R(Agent,Agent);
run r5bound.I(Agent,Agent);
run r5bound.R(Agent,Agent);
run r5bound.R(Agent);
run r5bound.R(Agent);
run r5bound.I(Agent,Agent);
run r5bound.R(Agent,Agent);
run r5bound.I(Agent,Agent);
run r5bound.R(Agent,Agent);
run r5bound.R(Agent);
run r5bound.R(Agent);

2
spdl/helloworld.spdl
View File

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ protocol hw(initiator,world)
role initiator
{
send_1(initiator, world, HelloWorld);
claim_2(initiator, Secret, HelloWorld);
/* claim_2(initiator, Secret, HelloWorld); */
}
}

26
spdl/ns3-brutus.spdl
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
protocol ns3(I,R)
protocol ns3brutus(I,R)
{
role I
{
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim(I,Secret,nr);
claim_4(I,Secret,nr);
}
role R
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim(I,Secret,ni);
claim_5(I,Secret,ni);
}
}
@ -38,13 +38,13 @@ compromised sk(Eve);
/* pre-defined 10 runs, limit using --max-runs parameters */
/* to be nice to brutus, stupid scenario :( */
run ns3.R(Agent,Bob);
run ns3.I(Alice,Agent);
run ns3.R(Agent,Bob);
run ns3.I(Alice,Agent);
run ns3.R(Agent,Bob);
run ns3.I(Alice,Agent);
run ns3.R(Agent,Bob);
run ns3.I(Alice,Agent);
run ns3.R(Agent,Bob);
run ns3.I(Alice,Agent);
run ns3brutus.R(Agent,Bob);
run ns3brutus.I(Alice,Agent);
run ns3brutus.R(Agent,Bob);
run ns3brutus.I(Alice,Agent);
run ns3brutus.R(Agent,Bob);
run ns3brutus.I(Alice,Agent);
run ns3brutus.R(Agent,Bob);
run ns3brutus.I(Alice,Agent);
run ns3brutus.R(Agent,Bob);
run ns3brutus.I(Alice,Agent);

6
spdl/ns3-nisynch.spdl
View File

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_4(I,Nisynch);
claim_5(I,Secret, ni,nr);
}
role R
@ -23,14 +24,15 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_5(R,Nisynch);
claim_6(R,Nisynch);
claim_7(R,Secret, ni,nr);
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const nc: Nonce;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);
run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);

10
spdl/ns3-var.spdl
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
protocol ns3(I,R)
protocol ns3var(I,R)
{
role I
{
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim(I,Secret,ni,nr);
claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr);
}
role R
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim(R,Secret,ni,nr);
claim_5(R,Secret,ni,nr);
}
}
@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ untrusted Eve;
const nc: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);
run ns3.I(Agent,Agent);
run ns3.R(Agent,Agent);
run ns3var.I(Agent,Agent);
run ns3var.R(Agent,Agent);

6
spdl/nsl3-nisynch.spdl
View File

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_4(I,Nisynch);
claim_5(I,Secret,ni,nr);
}
role R
@ -23,14 +24,15 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim_5(R,Nisynch);
claim_6(R,Nisynch);
claim_7(R,Secret,ni,nr);
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const nc: Nonce;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised sk(Eve);
run nsl3.I(Agent,Agent);

4
spdl/nsl3-var.spdl
View File

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim(I,Secret,ni,nr);
claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr);
}
role R
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ protocol nsl3(I,R)
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim(I,Secret,ni,nr);
claim_5(I,Secret,ni,nr);
}
}

6
spdl/nsl7.spdl
View File

@ -12,11 +12,11 @@ protocol nsl7(I,R)
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr,R}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim(I,Secret,nr,ni);
claim_4(I,Secret,nr,ni);
}
}
const Alice,Bob;
run nsl3.R(Alice,Bob);
run nsl3.R(Alice,Bob);
run nsl7.R(Alice,Bob);
run nsl7.R(Alice,Bob);

1
spdl/onetrace.spdl
View File

@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ protocol onetrace(I)
read_1(I,I, input);
send_2(I,I, Hallo);
read_3(I,I, input);
claim_4(I, Secret, input);
}
}

5
spdl/simplest.spdl
View File

@ -10,8 +10,9 @@ protocol simplest(I)
var x: Nonce;
const n: Nonce;
read(I,I, x);
send(I,I, n, {n, x}k );
read_1(I,I, x);
send_2(I,I, n, {n, x}k );
claim_3(I, Secret, n);
}
}

2
spdl/soph.spdl
View File

@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ protocol soph(I,R)
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
read_2(R,I, ni );
claim_4(I,Niagree);
claim_3(I,Niagree);
}
role R

26
spdl/speedtest.spdl
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ const pk: Function;
secret sk: Function;
inversekeys (pk,sk);
protocol ns3(I,R)
protocol ns3speedtest(I,R)
{
role I
{
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim(I,Secret,nr);
claim_4(I,Secret,nr);
}
role R
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ protocol ns3(I,R)
read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
claim(I,Secret,ni);
claim_5(I,Secret,ni);
}
}
@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ compromised sk(Eve);
/* pre-defined 10 runs, limit using --max-runs parameters */
run ns3.I(Alice,Bob);
run ns3.R(Alice,Bob);
run ns3.I(Alice,Eve);
run ns3.R(Eve,Bob);
run ns3.I(Bob,Alice);
run ns3.R(Bob,Alice);
run ns3.I(Bob,Eve);
run ns3.R(Eve,Alice);
run ns3.I(Alice,Alice);
run ns3.R(Bob,Bob);
run ns3speedtest.I(Alice,Bob);
run ns3speedtest.R(Alice,Bob);
run ns3speedtest.I(Alice,Eve);
run ns3speedtest.R(Eve,Bob);
run ns3speedtest.I(Bob,Alice);
run ns3speedtest.R(Bob,Alice);
run ns3speedtest.I(Bob,Eve);
run ns3speedtest.R(Eve,Alice);
run ns3speedtest.I(Alice,Alice);
run ns3speedtest.R(Bob,Bob);

2
spdl/woolam-ce.spdl
View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ protocol woolamce(A,B,S)
send_6(B,A, { B,(Na,(Nb,Kab)) }Kas, { Na,Nb }Kab );
read_7(A,B, { Nb }Kab );
claim(B,Secret,authToken);
claim_8(B,Secret,authToken);
}
}