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				| @ -24,33 +24,33 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol andrewConcrete(I,R) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var nr: Nonce; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I,ni ); | ||||
| 		read_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(I,R, {ni}kir); | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I,ni ); | ||||
|         read_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, {ni}kir); | ||||
|         claim_4(I,Secret,kir); | ||||
| 		claim_5(I,Nisynch); | ||||
| 		read_6(R,I, nr); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|         claim_5(I,Nisynch); | ||||
|         read_6(R,I, nr); | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const nr: Nonce; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         const nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         const kir: SessionKey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,R, I,ni ); | ||||
| 		send_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		read_3(I,R, {ni}kir); | ||||
| 		send_6(R,I, nr); | ||||
| 		claim_7(R,Secret,kir); | ||||
| 		claim_8(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I,ni ); | ||||
|         send_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         read_3(I,R, {ni}kir); | ||||
|         send_6(R,I, nr); | ||||
|         claim_7(R,Secret,kir); | ||||
|         claim_8(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -16,37 +16,37 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol andrewBan(I,R) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var nr,nr2: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var nr,nr2: Nonce; | ||||
|         var kir: SessionKey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		claim_5(I,Nisynch); | ||||
| 		claim_5b(I,Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_6(I,Secret, kir); | ||||
| 		claim_7(I,Secret, k(I,R)); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         claim_5(I,Nisynch); | ||||
|         claim_5b(I,Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_6(I,Secret, kir); | ||||
|         claim_7(I,Secret, k(I,R)); | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const nr,nr2: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         const nr,nr2: Nonce; | ||||
|         const kir: SessionKey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		read_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		claim_8(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 		claim_8b(R,Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_9(R,Secret, kir); | ||||
| 		claim_10(R,Secret, k(I,R)); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         read_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         claim_8(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|         claim_8b(R,Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_9(R,Secret, kir); | ||||
|         claim_10(R,Secret, k(I,R)); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -23,33 +23,33 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol andrewLoweBan(I,R) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var kir: SessionKey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I,ni ); | ||||
| 		read_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(I,R, {ni}kir ); | ||||
| 		claim_5(I,Nisynch); | ||||
| 		claim_6(I,Secret, kir); | ||||
| 		read_4(R,I, nr ); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I,ni ); | ||||
|         read_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, {ni}kir ); | ||||
|         claim_5(I,Nisynch); | ||||
|         claim_6(I,Secret, kir); | ||||
|         read_4(R,I, nr ); | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         const nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         const kir: SessionKey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,R, I,ni ); | ||||
| 		send_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		read_3(I,R, {ni}kir ); | ||||
| 		send_4(R,I, nr ); | ||||
| 		claim_8(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 		claim_9(R,Secret, kir); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I,ni ); | ||||
|         send_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         read_3(I,R, {ni}kir ); | ||||
|         send_4(R,I, nr ); | ||||
|         claim_8(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|         claim_9(R,Secret, kir); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -15,33 +15,33 @@ const succ: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol andrew(I,R) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var nr,nr2: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var nr,nr2: Nonce; | ||||
|         var kir: SessionKey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		read_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		claim_5(I,Secret,kir); | ||||
| 		claim_6(I,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         read_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         claim_5(I,Secret,kir); | ||||
|         claim_6(I,Nisynch); | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const nr,nr2: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         const nr,nr2: Nonce; | ||||
|         const kir: SessionKey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		send_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		read_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) ); | ||||
| 		claim_7(R,Secret,kir); | ||||
| 		claim_8(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         send_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         read_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) ); | ||||
|         claim_7(R,Secret,kir); | ||||
|         claim_8(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -16,24 +16,24 @@ usertype Timestamp; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol ccitt5091(I,R) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Ta: Timestamp; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ta: Timestamp; | ||||
|         const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce; | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         # claim_2(I,Nisynch); | ||||
|         # This claim is useless as there are no preceding read events | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Ta: Timestamp; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Ta: Timestamp; | ||||
|         var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
| 		claim_3(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         claim_3(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|         # There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -15,24 +15,24 @@ usertype Timestamp; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol ccitt5091c(I,R) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Ta: Timestamp; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ta: Timestamp; | ||||
|         const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce; | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya,{hash(Ya)}sk(I)}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya,{hash(Ya)}sk(I)}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         # claim_2(I,Nisynch); | ||||
|         # This claim is useless as there are no preceding read events | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Ta: Timestamp; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Ta: Timestamp; | ||||
|         var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya,{hash(Ya)}sk(I)}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
| 		claim_3(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya,{hash(Ya)}sk(I)}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         claim_3(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|         # There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -15,31 +15,31 @@ usertype Timestamp; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol ccitt5093(I,R) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Ta: Timestamp; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ta: Timestamp; | ||||
|         var Tb: Timestamp; | ||||
|         const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Xb,Nb,Yb: Nonce; | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         read_2(R,I, R,{Tb, Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R)); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, I, {Nb}sk(I)); | ||||
|         claim_4(I,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Ta: Timestamp; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Ta: Timestamp; | ||||
|         const Tb: Timestamp; | ||||
|         var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce; | ||||
|         const Xb,Yb,Nb: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         send_2(R,I, R,{Tb, Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R)); | ||||
|         read_3(I,R, I, {Nb}sk(I)); | ||||
| 		claim_5(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|         claim_5(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|         # There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -17,28 +17,28 @@ inversekeys(pk,sk); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol ccitt509ban3(I,R) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Xb,Nb,Yb: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         read_2(R,I, R,{Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R)); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, I,{R, Nb}sk(I)); | ||||
|         claim_4(I,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce; | ||||
|         const Xb,Yb,Nb: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I)); | ||||
|         send_2(R,I, R,{Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R)); | ||||
|         read_3(I,R, I,{R, Nb}sk(I)); | ||||
| 		claim_5(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|         claim_5(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|         # There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -21,42 +21,42 @@ const dec: PseudoFunction; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol denningSaccoLowe(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var W: Ticket; | ||||
| 		var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         var T: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,S, I,R ); | ||||
| 		read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(I,R, W); | ||||
|         send_1(I,S, I,R ); | ||||
|         read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) ); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, W); | ||||
|         read_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir); | ||||
|         send_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir); | ||||
| 		claim_6(I,Niagree); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|         claim_6(I,Niagree); | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         var T: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S)); | ||||
|         read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S)); | ||||
|         send_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir); | ||||
|         read_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir); | ||||
| 		claim_8(R,Niagree); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_8(R,Niagree); | ||||
|     } | ||||
|      | ||||
|     role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var W: Ticket; | ||||
| 		const Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         const Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         const T: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,S, I,R ); | ||||
| 		send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S)); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|         read_1(I,S, I,R ); | ||||
|         send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S)); | ||||
|     }     | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -16,36 +16,36 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol denningSacco(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var W: Ticket; | ||||
| 		var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         var T: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,S, I,R ); | ||||
| 		read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(I,R, W); | ||||
| 		claim_4(I,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
| 	 | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|         var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         var T: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S)); | ||||
| 		claim_8(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         send_1(I,S, I,R ); | ||||
|         read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) ); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, W); | ||||
|         claim_4(I,Nisynch); | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         var T: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
|         read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S)); | ||||
|         claim_8(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
|      | ||||
|     role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var W: Ticket; | ||||
| 		const Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         const Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         const T: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,S, I,R ); | ||||
| 		send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S)); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|         read_1(I,S, I,R ); | ||||
|         send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S)); | ||||
|     }     | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -14,45 +14,45 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol kaochow2(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var kir,kt: Sessionkey; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var kir,kt: Sessionkey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); | ||||
| 		read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr ); | ||||
| 		send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt ); | ||||
|         send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); | ||||
|         read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr ); | ||||
|         send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_5 (I, Nisynch); | ||||
| 		claim_6 (I, Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_7 (I, Secret, kir); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|         claim_5 (I, Nisynch); | ||||
|         claim_6 (I, Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_7 (I, Secret, kir); | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var kir,kt: Sessionkey; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         const nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var kir,kt: Sessionkey; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S)  );  | ||||
| 		send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr ); | ||||
| 		read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt ); | ||||
|         read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S)  );  | ||||
|         send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr ); | ||||
|         read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_8 (R, Nisynch); | ||||
| 		claim_9 (R, Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_10 (R, Secret, kir); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_8 (R, Nisynch); | ||||
|         claim_9 (R, Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_10 (R, Secret, kir); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const kir, kt: Sessionkey; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         const kir, kt: Sessionkey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); | ||||
| 		send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S)  );  | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); | ||||
|         send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S)  );  | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -15,47 +15,47 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol kaochow3(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var kir,kt: Sessionkey; | ||||
| 		var T2: Ticket; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var kir,kt: Sessionkey; | ||||
|         var T2: Ticket; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); | ||||
| 		read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 ); | ||||
| 		send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, T2 ); | ||||
|         send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); | ||||
|         read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 ); | ||||
|         send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, T2 ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_5 (I, Nisynch); | ||||
| 		claim_6 (I, Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_7 (I, Secret, kir); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|         claim_5 (I, Nisynch); | ||||
|         claim_6 (I, Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_7 (I, Secret, kir); | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var kir,kt: Sessionkey; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 		const tr: Timestamp; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         const nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var kir,kt: Sessionkey; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|         const tr: Timestamp; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S)  );  | ||||
| 		send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 		read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S)  );  | ||||
|         send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_8 (R, Nisynch); | ||||
| 		claim_9 (R, Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_10 (R, Secret, kir); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_8 (R, Nisynch); | ||||
|         claim_9 (R, Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_10 (R, Secret, kir); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const kir, kt: Sessionkey; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         const kir, kt: Sessionkey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); | ||||
| 		send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S)  );  | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); | ||||
|         send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S)  );  | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -14,45 +14,45 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol kaochow(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var kir: Sessionkey; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var kir: Sessionkey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); | ||||
| 		read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), {ni}kir, nr ); | ||||
| 		send_4 (I,R, {nr}kir ); | ||||
|         send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); | ||||
|         read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), {ni}kir, nr ); | ||||
|         send_4 (I,R, {nr}kir ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_5 (I, Nisynch); | ||||
| 		claim_6 (I, Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_7 (I, Secret, kir); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|         claim_5 (I, Nisynch); | ||||
|         claim_6 (I, Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_7 (I, Secret, kir); | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var kir: Sessionkey; | ||||
| 		var T; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         const nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var kir: Sessionkey; | ||||
|         var T; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );  | ||||
| 		send_3 (R,I, T, {ni}kir, nr ); | ||||
| 		read_4 (I,R, {nr}kir ); | ||||
|         read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );  | ||||
|         send_3 (R,I, T, {ni}kir, nr ); | ||||
|         read_4 (I,R, {nr}kir ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_8 (R, Nisynch); | ||||
| 		claim_9 (R, Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_10 (R, Secret, kir); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_8 (R, Nisynch); | ||||
|         claim_9 (R, Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_10 (R, Secret, kir); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const kir: Sessionkey; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         const kir: Sessionkey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); | ||||
| 		send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S)  );  | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni); | ||||
|         send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S)  );  | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -25,58 +25,58 @@ compromised k(e,s); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol kslLowe(A,B,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role A | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Na, Ma: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Nc, Mb: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 		var Kab: SessionKey; | ||||
|     role A | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Na, Ma: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Nc, Mb: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|         var Kab: SessionKey; | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		send_1(A,B, Na, A); | ||||
| 		read_4(B,A, { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S), T, Nc, {B,Na}Kab ); | ||||
| 		send_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab ); | ||||
|         send_1(A,B, Na, A); | ||||
|         read_4(B,A, { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S), T, Nc, {B,Na}Kab ); | ||||
|         send_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab ); | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		send_6(A,B, Ma,T ); | ||||
| 		read_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma, B}Kab ); | ||||
| 		send_8(A,B, {A,Mb}Kab ); | ||||
|         send_6(A,B, Ma,T ); | ||||
|         read_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma, B}Kab ); | ||||
|         send_8(A,B, {A,Mb}Kab ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab); | ||||
| 		claim_A2(A,Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_A3(A,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab); | ||||
|         claim_A2(A,Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_A3(A,Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role B | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Na,Ma: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const Nb,Nc,Mb: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Kab: SessionKey; | ||||
| 		const Kbb: TicketKey; | ||||
| 		const Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
|     role B | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Na,Ma: Nonce; | ||||
|         const Nb,Nc,Mb: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Kab: SessionKey; | ||||
|         const Kbb: TicketKey; | ||||
|         const Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		read_1(A,B, Na, A); | ||||
| 		send_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B ); | ||||
| 		read_3(S,B, { A, Nb, Kab }k(B,S), T ); | ||||
| 		send_4(B,A, T, { Tb, A, Kab }Kbb, Nc, {B, Na}Kab ); | ||||
| 		read_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab ); | ||||
|         read_1(A,B, Na, A); | ||||
|         send_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B ); | ||||
|         read_3(S,B, { A, Nb, Kab }k(B,S), T ); | ||||
|         send_4(B,A, T, { Tb, A, Kab }Kbb, Nc, {B, Na}Kab ); | ||||
|         read_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab ); | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		read_6(A,B, Ma,{ Tb, A, Kab }Kbb ); | ||||
| 		send_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma,B}Kab ); | ||||
| 		read_8(A,B, {A,Mb}Kab ); | ||||
|         read_6(A,B, Ma,{ Tb, A, Kab }Kbb ); | ||||
|         send_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma,B}Kab ); | ||||
|         read_8(A,B, {A,Mb}Kab ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab); | ||||
| 		claim_B2(B,Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_B3(B,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab); | ||||
|         claim_B2(B,Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_B3(B,Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Na, Nb: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const Kab: SessionKey; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Na, Nb: Nonce; | ||||
|         const Kab: SessionKey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B ); | ||||
| 		send_3(S,B, { A, Nb, Kab }k(B,S), { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S) ); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B ); | ||||
|         send_3(S,B, { A, Nb, Kab }k(B,S), { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S) ); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| run kslLowe.A(a,b,s); | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -22,58 +22,58 @@ compromised k(e,s); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol ksl(A,B,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role A | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Na, Ma: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Nc, Mb: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 		var Kab: SessionKey; | ||||
|     role A | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Na, Ma: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Nc, Mb: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|         var Kab: SessionKey; | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		send_1(A,B, Na, A); | ||||
| 		read_4(B,A, { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S), T, Nc, {Na}Kab ); | ||||
| 		send_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab ); | ||||
|         send_1(A,B, Na, A); | ||||
|         read_4(B,A, { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S), T, Nc, {Na}Kab ); | ||||
|         send_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab ); | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		send_6(A,B, Ma,T ); | ||||
| 		read_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma}Kab ); | ||||
| 		send_8(A,B, {Mb}Kab ); | ||||
|         send_6(A,B, Ma,T ); | ||||
|         read_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma}Kab ); | ||||
|         send_8(A,B, {Mb}Kab ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab); | ||||
| 		claim_A2(A,Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_A3(A,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab); | ||||
|         claim_A2(A,Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_A3(A,Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role B | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Na,Ma: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const Nb,Nc,Mb: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Kab: SessionKey; | ||||
| 		const Kbb: TicketKey; | ||||
| 		const Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
|     role B | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Na,Ma: Nonce; | ||||
|         const Nb,Nc,Mb: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Kab: SessionKey; | ||||
|         const Kbb: TicketKey; | ||||
|         const Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		read_1(A,B, Na, A); | ||||
| 		send_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B ); | ||||
| 		read_3(S,B, { Nb, A, Kab }k(B,S), T ); | ||||
| 		send_4(B,A, T, { Tb, A, Kab }Kbb, Nc, {Na}Kab ); | ||||
| 		read_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab ); | ||||
|         read_1(A,B, Na, A); | ||||
|         send_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B ); | ||||
|         read_3(S,B, { Nb, A, Kab }k(B,S), T ); | ||||
|         send_4(B,A, T, { Tb, A, Kab }Kbb, Nc, {Na}Kab ); | ||||
|         read_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab ); | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		read_6(A,B, Ma,{ Tb, A, Kab }Kbb ); | ||||
| 		send_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma}Kab ); | ||||
| 		read_8(A,B, {Mb}Kab ); | ||||
|         read_6(A,B, Ma,{ Tb, A, Kab }Kbb ); | ||||
|         send_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma}Kab ); | ||||
|         read_8(A,B, {Mb}Kab ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab); | ||||
| 		claim_B2(B,Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_B3(B,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab); | ||||
|         claim_B2(B,Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_B3(B,Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Na, Nb: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const Kab: SessionKey; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Na, Nb: Nonce; | ||||
|         const Kab: SessionKey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B ); | ||||
| 		send_3(S,B, { Nb, A, Kab }k(B,S), { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S) ); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B ); | ||||
|         send_3(S,B, { Nb, A, Kab }k(B,S), { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S) ); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| run ksl.A(a,b,s); | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -16,22 +16,22 @@ inversekeys(pk,sk); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol needhamschroederpkLowe(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,S, (I,R)); | ||||
|         send_1(I,S, (I,R)); | ||||
|         read_2(S,I, {pk(R), R}sk(S)); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R)); | ||||
|         read_6(R,I, {Ni,Nr,R}pk(I)); | ||||
|         send_7(I,R, {Nr}pk(R)); | ||||
|         claim_I1(I,Secret,Ni); | ||||
|         claim_I2(I,Secret,Nr); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|          | ||||
| @ -42,7 +42,7 @@ protocol needhamschroederpkLowe(I,R,S) | ||||
|         read_7(I,R,{Nr}pk(R)); | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Secret,Nr); | ||||
|         claim_R2(R,Secret,Ni); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -23,8 +23,8 @@ usertype Ticket; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol needhamschroederskamend(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
| @ -40,10 +40,10 @@ protocol needhamschroederskamend(I,R,S) | ||||
|          | ||||
|         claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I3(I,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|          | ||||
| @ -54,7 +54,7 @@ protocol needhamschroederskamend(I,R,S) | ||||
|         read_7(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Secret,Nr); | ||||
|         claim_R3(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -19,24 +19,24 @@ usertype Ticket; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		send_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni)); | ||||
|         send_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni)); | ||||
|         read_2(S,I, {Ni,R,Kir,T}k(I,S)); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R,T); | ||||
|         read_4(R,I,{Nr}Kir); | ||||
|         send_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I3(I,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|          | ||||
| @ -45,7 +45,7 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S) | ||||
|         read_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R3(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -16,22 +16,22 @@ inversekeys(pk,sk); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol needhamschroederpk(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,S,(I,R)); | ||||
|         send_1(I,S,(I,R)); | ||||
|         read_2(S,I, {pk(R), R}sk(S)); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R)); | ||||
|         read_6(R,I, {Ni, Nr}pk(I)); | ||||
|         send_7(I,R, {Nr}pk(R)); | ||||
|         claim_I1(I,Secret,Ni); | ||||
|         claim_I2(I,Secret,Nr); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|          | ||||
| @ -42,7 +42,7 @@ protocol needhamschroederpk(I,R,S) | ||||
|         read_7(I,R,{Nr}pk(R)); | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Secret,Nr); | ||||
|         claim_R2(R,Secret,Ni); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -25,55 +25,55 @@ compromised k(e,s); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol neustubHwang(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Ni,Mi: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Nr,Mr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ni,Mi: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Nr,Mr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|         var Tb: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 		var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I, Ni); | ||||
| 		read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr); | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I, Ni); | ||||
|         read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr); | ||||
|         send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir); | ||||
|         send_5(I,R,Mi,T); | ||||
| 		read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mr}Kir); | ||||
| 		send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir); | ||||
|         read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mr}Kir); | ||||
|         send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir); | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir); | ||||
| 		claim_I2(I,Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_I3(I,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I2(I,Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_I3(I,Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Ni,Mi: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const Nr,Mr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
| 		const Tb: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Ni,Mi: Nonce; | ||||
|         const Nr,Mr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         const Tb: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|          | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I, Ni); | ||||
|         send_2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb, Nr}k(R,S)); | ||||
|         read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir); | ||||
|         read_5(I,R,Mi,T); | ||||
| 		send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mr}Kir); | ||||
| 		read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir); | ||||
|         send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mr}Kir); | ||||
|         read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir); | ||||
|      | ||||
| 		claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir); | ||||
| 		claim_R2(R,Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_R3(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R2(R,Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_R3(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Ni, Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Ni, Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         const Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         var Tb: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb,Nr}k(R,S)); | ||||
| 		send_3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr ); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb,Nr}k(R,S)); | ||||
|         send_3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr ); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| run neustubHwang.A(a,b,s); | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -22,55 +22,55 @@ compromised k(e,s); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol neustub(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Ni,Mi: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Nr,Mr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ni,Mi: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Nr,Mr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|         var Tb: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 		var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I, Ni); | ||||
| 		read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr); | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I, Ni); | ||||
|         read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr); | ||||
|         send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir); | ||||
|         send_5(I,R,Mi,T); | ||||
| 		read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir); | ||||
| 		send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir); | ||||
|         read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir); | ||||
|         send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir); | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir); | ||||
| 		claim_I2(I,Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_I3(I,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I2(I,Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_I3(I,Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Ni,Mi: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const Nr,Mr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
| 		const Tb: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Ni,Mi: Nonce; | ||||
|         const Nr,Mr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         const Tb: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|          | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I, Ni); | ||||
|         send_2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb}k(R,S),Nr); | ||||
|         read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir); | ||||
|         read_5(I,R,Mi,T); | ||||
| 		send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir); | ||||
| 		read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir); | ||||
|         send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir); | ||||
|         read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir); | ||||
|      | ||||
| 		claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir); | ||||
| 		claim_R2(R,Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_R3(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R2(R,Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_R3(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Ni, Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Ni, Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         const Kir: SessionKey; | ||||
|         var Tb: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr); | ||||
| 		send_3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr ); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr); | ||||
|         send_3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr ); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| run neustub.A(a,b,s); | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -16,44 +16,44 @@ usertype String,SessionKey,Ticket; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol otwayrees(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Ni : Nonce; | ||||
| 		const M : String; | ||||
| 		var Kir : SessionKey; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ni : Nonce; | ||||
|         const M : String; | ||||
|         var Kir : SessionKey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, M,I,R,{Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S) ); | ||||
| 		read_4(R,I, M,{Ni,Kir}k(I,S) ); | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, M,I,R,{Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S) ); | ||||
|         read_4(R,I, M,{Ni,Kir}k(I,S) ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         #claim_I2(I, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var M : String; | ||||
| 		const Nr : Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Kir : SessionKey; | ||||
| 		var T1,T2: Ticket; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var M : String; | ||||
|         const Nr : Nonce; | ||||
|         var Kir : SessionKey; | ||||
|         var T1,T2: Ticket; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,R, M,I,R, T1 ); | ||||
| 		send_2(R,S, M,I,R, T1, { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 		read_3(S,R, M, T2, { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 		send_4(R,I, M, T2 ); | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, M,I,R, T1 ); | ||||
|         send_2(R,S, M,I,R, T1, { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         read_3(S,R, M, T2, { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         send_4(R,I, M, T2 ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         #claim_R2(R, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Ni,Nr : Nonce; | ||||
| 		var M : String; | ||||
| 		const Kir : SessionKey; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Ni,Nr : Nonce; | ||||
|         var M : String; | ||||
|         const Kir : SessionKey; | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		read_2(R,S, M,I,R, { Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S), { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(S,R, M, { Ni,Kir }k(I,S) , { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_2(R,S, M,I,R, { Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S), { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         send_3(S,R, M, { Ni,Kir }k(I,S) , { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) ); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice, Bob, Eve, Simon: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -25,9 +25,9 @@ const Vor: XorKey; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol smartright(I,R) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const VoKey: SessionKey; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const VoKey: SessionKey; | ||||
|         const VoR: XorKey; | ||||
|         const CW; | ||||
|         var VoRi: Nonce; | ||||
| @ -35,10 +35,10 @@ protocol smartright(I,R) | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, {VoKey,{CW}VoR}k(I,R)); | ||||
|         read_2(R,I, VoRi); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, VoR, {{VoRi}hash}VoKey); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|         var VoR: XorKey; | ||||
|         var VoKey: SessionKey; | ||||
| @ -48,8 +48,8 @@ protocol smartright(I,R) | ||||
|         send_2(R,I, VoRi); | ||||
|         read_3(I,R, VoR,{{VoRi}hash}VoKey); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_R1(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -21,50 +21,50 @@ inversekeys (inc,dec); | ||||
| protocol spliceASCJ(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
|         role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const N1,N2: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const T: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 		const L: LifeTime; | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const N1,N2: Nonce; | ||||
|         const T: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         const L: LifeTime; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,S,  I, R, N1 ); | ||||
| 		read_2(S,I,  S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(I,R,  I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); | ||||
| 		read_6(R,I,  R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) ); | ||||
|         send_1(I,S,  I, R, N1 ); | ||||
|         read_2(S,I,  S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) ); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R,  I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); | ||||
|         read_6(R,I,  R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_7(I, Secret, N2); | ||||
| 		claim_9(I, Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_10(I, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_7(I, Secret, N2); | ||||
|         claim_9(I, Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_10(I, Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var N1,N3: Nonce; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var N1,N3: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,S,  I, R, N1 ); | ||||
| 		send_2(S,I,  S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) ); | ||||
| 		read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); | ||||
| 		send_5(S,R,  S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) ); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_1(I,S,  I, R, N1 ); | ||||
|         send_2(S,I,  S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) ); | ||||
|         read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); | ||||
|         send_5(S,R,  S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) ); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const N3: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var N2: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var T: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 		var L: LifeTime; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const N3: Nonce; | ||||
|         var N2: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         var L: LifeTime; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		var ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         const nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); | ||||
| 		send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); | ||||
| 		read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) ); | ||||
| 		send_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) ); | ||||
|         read_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); | ||||
|         send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); | ||||
|         read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) ); | ||||
|         send_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_8(R, Secret, N2); | ||||
| 		claim_11(R, Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_12(R, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_8(R, Secret, N2); | ||||
|         claim_11(R, Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_12(R, Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -16,50 +16,50 @@ inversekeys (inc,dec); | ||||
| protocol spliceASHC(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
|         role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const N1,N2: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const T: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 		const L: LifeTime; | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const N1,N2: Nonce; | ||||
|         const T: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         const L: LifeTime; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,S,  I, R, N1 ); | ||||
| 		read_2(S,I,  S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(I,R,  I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); | ||||
| 		read_6(R,I,  R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) ); | ||||
|         send_1(I,S,  I, R, N1 ); | ||||
|         read_2(S,I,  S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) ); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R,  I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); | ||||
|         read_6(R,I,  R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_7(I, Secret, N2); | ||||
| 		claim_9(I, Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_10(I, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_7(I, Secret, N2); | ||||
|         claim_9(I, Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_10(I, Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var N1,N3: Nonce; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var N1,N3: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,S,  I, R, N1 ); | ||||
| 		send_2(S,I,  S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) ); | ||||
| 		read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); | ||||
| 		send_5(S,R,  S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) ); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_1(I,S,  I, R, N1 ); | ||||
|         send_2(S,I,  S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) ); | ||||
|         read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); | ||||
|         send_5(S,R,  S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) ); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const N3: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var N2: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var T: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 		var L: LifeTime; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const N3: Nonce; | ||||
|         var N2: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         var L: LifeTime; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		var ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         const nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); | ||||
| 		send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); | ||||
| 		read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) ); | ||||
| 		send_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) ); | ||||
|         read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); | ||||
|         send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); | ||||
|         read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) ); | ||||
|         send_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_8(R, Secret, N2); | ||||
| 		claim_11(R, Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_12(R, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_8(R, Secret, N2); | ||||
|         claim_11(R, Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_12(R, Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -21,50 +21,50 @@ inversekeys (inc,dec); | ||||
| protocol spliceAS(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
|         role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const N1,N2: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const T: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 		const L: LifeTime; | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const N1,N2: Nonce; | ||||
|         const T: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         const L: LifeTime; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,S,  I, R, N1 ); | ||||
| 		read_2(S,I,  S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(I,R,  I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); | ||||
| 		read_6(R,I,  R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) ); | ||||
|         send_1(I,S,  I, R, N1 ); | ||||
|         read_2(S,I,  S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) ); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R,  I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); | ||||
|         read_6(R,I,  R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_7(I, Secret, N2); | ||||
| 		claim_9(I, Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_10(I, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_7(I, Secret, N2); | ||||
|         claim_9(I, Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_10(I, Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var N1,N3: Nonce; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var N1,N3: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,S,  I, R, N1 ); | ||||
| 		send_2(S,I,  S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) ); | ||||
| 		read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); | ||||
| 		send_5(S,R,  S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) ); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_1(I,S,  I, R, N1 ); | ||||
|         send_2(S,I,  S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) ); | ||||
|         read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); | ||||
|         send_5(S,R,  S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) ); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const N3: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var N2: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var T: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 		var L: LifeTime; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const N3: Nonce; | ||||
|         var N2: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         var L: LifeTime; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		var ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		const nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         const nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); | ||||
| 		send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); | ||||
| 		read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) ); | ||||
| 		send_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) ); | ||||
|         read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) ); | ||||
|         send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 ); | ||||
|         read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) ); | ||||
|         send_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_8(R, Secret, N2); | ||||
| 		claim_11(R, Niagree); | ||||
| 		claim_12(R, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_8(R, Secret, N2); | ||||
|         claim_11(R, Niagree); | ||||
|         claim_12(R, Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -12,37 +12,37 @@ inversekeys(pk,sk); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol tmn(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Ki: Key; | ||||
| 		var Kr: Key; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ki: Key; | ||||
|         var Kr: Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) ); | ||||
| 		read_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki ); | ||||
|         send_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) ); | ||||
|         read_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_I1(I,Secret,Ki); | ||||
| 		claim_I2(I,Secret,Kr); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|         claim_I1(I,Secret,Ki); | ||||
|         claim_I2(I,Secret,Kr); | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Kr: Key; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Kr: Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2(S,R, I ); | ||||
| 		send_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) ); | ||||
|         read_2(S,R, I ); | ||||
|         send_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_R1(R,Secret,Kr); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Secret,Kr); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Ki,Kr: Key; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Ki,Kr: Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) ); | ||||
| 		send_2(S,R, I ); | ||||
| 		read_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) ); | ||||
| 		send_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki ); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) ); | ||||
|         send_2(S,R, I ); | ||||
|         read_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) ); | ||||
|         send_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki ); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -18,44 +18,44 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol wmfLowe(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Kir: Key; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Kir: Key; | ||||
|         const Ti: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 		var Kr: Key; | ||||
|         var Kr: Key; | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));  | ||||
|         send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));  | ||||
|         read_3(R,I,{Nr}Kir); | ||||
|         send_4(I,R,{{Nr}succ}Kir); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I2(I,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Ts: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         send_3(R,I, {Nr}Kir); | ||||
|         read_4(I,R, {{Nr}succ}Kir); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R2(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Kir: Key; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
|         const Ts: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         var Ti: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) ); | ||||
|         read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) ); | ||||
|         send_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S)); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -11,37 +11,37 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol wmf(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Kir: Key; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Kir: Key; | ||||
|         const Ti: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 		var Kr: Key; | ||||
|         var Kr: Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));  | ||||
|         send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));  | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|         claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Ts: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R2(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Kir: Key; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
|         const Ts: TimeStamp; | ||||
|         var Ti: TimeStamp; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) ); | ||||
|         read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) ); | ||||
|         send_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S)); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -14,18 +14,18 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol woolamPi1(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I);  | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I);  | ||||
|         read_2(R,I, Nr); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S)); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| @ -36,15 +36,15 @@ protocol woolamPi1(I,R,S) | ||||
|         read_5(S,R, {I,R, Nr}k(R,S)); | ||||
|          | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|          | ||||
|         read_4(R,S, {I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S)); | ||||
|         send_5(S,R, {I,R,Nr}k(R,S)); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -14,18 +14,18 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol woolamPi2(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I);  | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I);  | ||||
|         read_2(R,I, Nr); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, {I,Nr}k(I,S)); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| @ -36,15 +36,15 @@ protocol woolamPi2(I,R,S) | ||||
|         read_5(S,R, {I, Nr}k(R,S)); | ||||
|          | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|          | ||||
|         read_4(R,S, {I, {I,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S)); | ||||
|         send_5(S,R, {I,Nr}k(R,S)); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -14,18 +14,18 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol woolamPi3(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I);  | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I);  | ||||
|         read_2(R,I, Nr); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, {Nr}k(I,S)); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| @ -36,15 +36,15 @@ protocol woolamPi3(I,R,S) | ||||
|         read_5(S,R, {I, Nr}k(R,S)); | ||||
|          | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|          | ||||
|         read_4(R,S, {I, {Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S)); | ||||
|         send_5(S,R, {I,Nr}k(R,S)); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -14,18 +14,18 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol woolamPif(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I);  | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I);  | ||||
|         read_2(R,I, Nr); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S)); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| @ -36,15 +36,15 @@ protocol woolamPif(I,R,S) | ||||
|         read_5(S,R, {I, R, Nr}k(R,S)); | ||||
|          | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|          | ||||
|         read_4(R,S, {I, R, Nr,{I,R,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S)); | ||||
|         send_5(S,R, {I, R, Nr}k(R,S)); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -18,18 +18,18 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol woolamPi(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I);  | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I);  | ||||
|         read_2(R,I, Nr); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, {Nr}k(I,S)); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| @ -40,15 +40,15 @@ protocol woolamPi(I,R,S) | ||||
|         read_5(S,R, {Nr}k(R,S)); | ||||
|          | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|          | ||||
|         read_4(R,S, {I,{Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S)); | ||||
|         send_5(S,R, {Nr}k(R,S)); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -16,25 +16,25 @@ secret k: Function; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol woolam(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const N1: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
| 		var N2: Nonce; | ||||
|         var N2: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I, N1);  | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I, N1);  | ||||
|         read_2(R,I, R, N2); | ||||
|         send_3(I,R, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S)); | ||||
|         read_6(R,I, {R, N1, N2, Kir}k(I,S), {N1,N2}Kir); | ||||
|         send_7(I,R, {N2}Kir); | ||||
|          | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I2(I,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	}	 | ||||
|     }     | ||||
|      | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const N2: Nonce; | ||||
|         var N1: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
| @ -48,18 +48,18 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S) | ||||
|         send_6(R,I, T2, {N1,N2}Kir); | ||||
|         read_7(I,R, {N2}Kir); | ||||
|          | ||||
| 		claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R2(R,Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Kir: Key; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Kir: Key; | ||||
|         var N1,N2: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
|         read_4(R,S, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S), {I, R, N1, N2}k(R,S)); | ||||
|         send_5(S,R, {R, N1, N2, Kir}k(I,S), {I, N1, N2, Kir}k(R,S)); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -15,44 +15,44 @@ usertype Ticket, Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol yahalomBAN(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 		var Kir: Key; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
| 		read_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T ); | ||||
| 		send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir ); | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
|         read_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T ); | ||||
|         send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir); | ||||
| 		claim_I2(I, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I2(I, Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 		var Kir: Key; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
| 		send_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 		read_4(I,R, {I,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir ); | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
|         send_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         read_4(I,R, {I,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R2(R, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Kir: Key; | ||||
| 		var Ni,Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Kir: Key; | ||||
|         var Ni,Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), {I,Kir}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), {I,Kir}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Simon : Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -12,44 +12,44 @@ usertype Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol yahalomLowe(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Kir: Key; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
| 		read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S) ); | ||||
| 		send_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir ); | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
|         read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S) ); | ||||
|         send_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir); | ||||
| 		claim_I2(I, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I2(I, Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Kir: Key; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
| 		send_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 		read_4(S,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S)); | ||||
| 		read_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir); | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
|         send_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         read_4(S,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S)); | ||||
|         read_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R2(R, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Kir: Key; | ||||
| 		var Ni,Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Kir: Key; | ||||
|         var Ni,Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S)); | ||||
|         read_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S)); | ||||
|         send_4(S,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S)); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Simon : Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -15,44 +15,44 @@ usertype Ticket, Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol yahalomPaulson(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 		var Kir: Key; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
| 		read_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T ); | ||||
| 		send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir ); | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
|         read_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T ); | ||||
|         send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir); | ||||
| 		claim_I2(I, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I2(I, Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 		var Kir: Key; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
| 		send_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 		read_4(I,R, {I,R, Kir, Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir ); | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
|         send_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         read_4(I,R, {I,R, Kir, Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R2(R, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Kir: Key; | ||||
| 		var Ni,Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Kir: Key; | ||||
|         var Ni,Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), {I,R,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         send_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), {I,R,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Simon : Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
| @ -15,44 +15,44 @@ usertype Ticket, Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| protocol yahalom(I,R,S) | ||||
| { | ||||
| 	role I | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 		var Kir: Key; | ||||
|     role I | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		send_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
| 		read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), T ); | ||||
| 		send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir ); | ||||
|         send_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
|         read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), T ); | ||||
|         send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir); | ||||
| 		claim_I2(I, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_I2(I, Nisynch); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role R | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var Ni: Nonce; | ||||
| 		var T: Ticket; | ||||
| 		var Kir: Key; | ||||
|     role R | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|         var Ni: Nonce; | ||||
|         var T: Ticket; | ||||
|         var Kir: Key; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
| 		send_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 		read_4(I,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir ); | ||||
|         read_1(I,R, I,Ni); | ||||
|         send_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         read_4(I,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir ); | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir); | ||||
|         claim_R2(R, Nisynch); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|     } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 	role S | ||||
| 	{ | ||||
| 		const Kir: Key; | ||||
| 		var Ni,Nr: Nonce; | ||||
|     role S | ||||
|     { | ||||
|         const Kir: Key; | ||||
|         var Ni,Nr: Nonce; | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| 		read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 		send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), {I,Kir}k(R,S) ); | ||||
| 	} | ||||
|         read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|         send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), {I,Kir}k(R,S) ); | ||||
|     } | ||||
| } | ||||
| 
 | ||||
| const Alice,Bob,Simon : Agent; | ||||
|  | ||||
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	Block a user