Replaced all tabs by spaces.
This commit is contained in:
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b05843d690
commit
3cb999f820
@ -24,33 +24,33 @@ secret k: Function;
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protocol andrewConcrete(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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var kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, I,ni );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
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send_1(I,R, I,ni );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
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claim_4(I,Secret,kir);
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claim_5(I,Nisynch);
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read_6(R,I, nr);
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}
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claim_5(I,Nisynch);
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read_6(R,I, nr);
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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const kir: SessionKey;
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read_1(I,R, I,ni );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
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send_6(R,I, nr);
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claim_7(R,Secret,kir);
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claim_8(R,Nisynch);
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}
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read_1(I,R, I,ni );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,kir}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {ni}kir);
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send_6(R,I, nr);
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claim_7(R,Secret,kir);
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claim_8(R,Nisynch);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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@ -16,37 +16,37 @@ secret k: Function;
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protocol andrewBan(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr,nr2: Nonce;
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var kir: SessionKey;
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr,nr2: Nonce;
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var kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
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read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
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claim_5(I,Nisynch);
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claim_5b(I,Niagree);
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claim_6(I,Secret, kir);
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claim_7(I,Secret, k(I,R));
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}
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send_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
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read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
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claim_5(I,Nisynch);
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claim_5b(I,Niagree);
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claim_6(I,Secret, kir);
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claim_7(I,Secret, k(I,R));
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr,nr2: Nonce;
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const kir: SessionKey;
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr,nr2: Nonce;
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const kir: SessionKey;
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read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
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send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
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claim_8(R,Nisynch);
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claim_8b(R,Niagree);
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claim_9(R,Secret, kir);
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claim_10(R,Secret, k(I,R));
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}
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read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {nr}k(I,R) );
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send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2,ni}k(I,R) );
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claim_8(R,Nisynch);
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claim_8b(R,Niagree);
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claim_9(R,Secret, kir);
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claim_10(R,Secret, k(I,R));
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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@ -23,33 +23,33 @@ secret k: Function;
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protocol andrewLoweBan(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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var kir: SessionKey;
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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var kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, I,ni );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
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claim_5(I,Nisynch);
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claim_6(I,Secret, kir);
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read_4(R,I, nr );
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}
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send_1(I,R, I,ni );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
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claim_5(I,Nisynch);
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claim_6(I,Secret, kir);
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read_4(R,I, nr );
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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const kir: SessionKey;
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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const kir: SessionKey;
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read_1(I,R, I,ni );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
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send_4(R,I, nr );
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claim_8(R,Nisynch);
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claim_9(R,Secret, kir);
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}
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read_1(I,R, I,ni );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,kir,R}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {ni}kir );
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send_4(R,I, nr );
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claim_8(R,Nisynch);
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claim_9(R,Secret, kir);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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@ -15,33 +15,33 @@ const succ: Function;
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protocol andrew(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr,nr2: Nonce;
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var kir: SessionKey;
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr,nr2: Nonce;
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var kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
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read_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
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read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
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claim_5(I,Secret,kir);
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claim_6(I,Nisynch);
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}
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send_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
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read_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
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send_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
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read_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
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claim_5(I,Secret,kir);
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claim_6(I,Nisynch);
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr,nr2: Nonce;
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const kir: SessionKey;
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr,nr2: Nonce;
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const kir: SessionKey;
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read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
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send_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
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send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
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claim_7(R,Secret,kir);
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claim_8(R,Nisynch);
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}
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read_1(I,R, I,{ni}k(I,R) );
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send_2(R,I, {succ(ni),nr}k(I,R) );
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read_3(I,R, {succ(nr)}k(I,R) );
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send_4(R,I, {kir,nr2}k(I,R) );
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claim_7(R,Secret,kir);
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claim_8(R,Nisynch);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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@ -16,24 +16,24 @@ usertype Timestamp;
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protocol ccitt5091(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const Ta: Timestamp;
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role I
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{
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const Ta: Timestamp;
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const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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# claim_2(I,Nisynch);
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# This claim is useless as there are no preceding read events
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}
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}
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role R
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{
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var Ta: Timestamp;
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role R
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{
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var Ta: Timestamp;
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var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
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read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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claim_3(R,Nisynch);
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read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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claim_3(R,Nisynch);
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# There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here
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}
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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@ -15,24 +15,24 @@ usertype Timestamp;
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protocol ccitt5091c(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const Ta: Timestamp;
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role I
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{
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const Ta: Timestamp;
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const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya,{hash(Ya)}sk(I)}pk(R)}sk(I));
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send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya,{hash(Ya)}sk(I)}pk(R)}sk(I));
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# claim_2(I,Nisynch);
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# This claim is useless as there are no preceding read events
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}
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}
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role R
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{
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var Ta: Timestamp;
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role R
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{
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var Ta: Timestamp;
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var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
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read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya,{hash(Ya)}sk(I)}pk(R)}sk(I));
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claim_3(R,Nisynch);
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read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya,{hash(Ya)}sk(I)}pk(R)}sk(I));
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claim_3(R,Nisynch);
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# There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here
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}
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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@ -15,31 +15,31 @@ usertype Timestamp;
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protocol ccitt5093(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const Ta: Timestamp;
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role I
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{
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const Ta: Timestamp;
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var Tb: Timestamp;
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const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
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var Xb,Nb,Yb: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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read_2(R,I, R,{Tb, Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
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send_3(I,R, I, {Nb}sk(I));
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claim_4(I,Nisynch);
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}
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}
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role R
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{
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var Ta: Timestamp;
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role R
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{
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var Ta: Timestamp;
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const Tb: Timestamp;
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var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
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const Xb,Yb,Nb: Nonce;
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read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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send_2(R,I, R,{Tb, Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
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read_3(I,R, I, {Nb}sk(I));
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claim_5(R,Nisynch);
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claim_5(R,Nisynch);
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# There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here
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}
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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@ -17,28 +17,28 @@ inversekeys(pk,sk);
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protocol ccitt509ban3(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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role I
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{
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const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
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var Xb,Nb,Yb: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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send_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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read_2(R,I, R,{Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
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send_3(I,R, I,{R, Nb}sk(I));
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claim_4(I,Nisynch);
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}
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}
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role R
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{
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role R
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{
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var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
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const Xb,Yb,Nb: Nonce;
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read_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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read_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
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send_2(R,I, R,{Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
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read_3(I,R, I,{R, Nb}sk(I));
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claim_5(R,Nisynch);
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claim_5(R,Nisynch);
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# There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here
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}
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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@ -21,42 +21,42 @@ const dec: PseudoFunction;
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protocol denningSaccoLowe(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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role I
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{
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var W: Ticket;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var T: TimeStamp;
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var Nr: Nonce;
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send_1(I,S, I,R );
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read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
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send_3(I,R, W);
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send_1(I,S, I,R );
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read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
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send_3(I,R, W);
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read_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
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send_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
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claim_6(I,Niagree);
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}
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claim_6(I,Niagree);
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}
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role R
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{
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role R
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{
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var T: TimeStamp;
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const Nr: Nonce;
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read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
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read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
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send_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
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read_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
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claim_8(R,Niagree);
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}
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claim_8(R,Niagree);
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}
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role S
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{
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{
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var W: Ticket;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const T: TimeStamp;
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read_1(I,S, I,R );
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send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
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}
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read_1(I,S, I,R );
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send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
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@ -16,36 +16,36 @@ secret k: Function;
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protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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role I
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{
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var W: Ticket;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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var T: TimeStamp;
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send_1(I,S, I,R );
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read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
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send_3(I,R, W);
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claim_4(I,Nisynch);
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}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
|
||||
claim_8(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I,R );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, W);
|
||||
claim_4(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
|
||||
claim_8(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
{
|
||||
var W: Ticket;
|
||||
const Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
const Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
const T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I,R );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I,R );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -14,45 +14,45 @@ secret k: Function;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol kaochow2(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr );
|
||||
send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
|
||||
send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr );
|
||||
send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_5 (I, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_6 (I, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_7 (I, Secret, kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_5 (I, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_6 (I, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_7 (I, Secret, kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr );
|
||||
read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
|
||||
read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr );
|
||||
read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_8 (R, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_9 (R, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_10 (R, Secret, kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_8 (R, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_9 (R, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_10 (R, Secret, kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const kir, kt: Sessionkey;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const kir, kt: Sessionkey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -15,47 +15,47 @@ secret k: Function;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol kaochow3(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
|
||||
var T2: Ticket;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
|
||||
var T2: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 );
|
||||
send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, T2 );
|
||||
send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
read_3 (R,I, R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), {ni, kir}kt, nr, T2 );
|
||||
send_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, T2 );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_5 (I, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_6 (I, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_7 (I, Secret, kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_5 (I, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_6 (I, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_7 (I, Secret, kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
const tr: Timestamp;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var kir,kt: Sessionkey;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
const tr: Timestamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3 (R,I, R, T, {ni, kir}kt, nr, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4 (I,R, {nr,kir}kt, {I,R,tr,kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_8 (R, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_9 (R, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_10 (R, Secret, kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_8 (R, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_9 (R, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_10 (R, Secret, kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const kir, kt: Sessionkey;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const kir, kt: Sessionkey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir,kt}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir,kt }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -14,45 +14,45 @@ secret k: Function;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol kaochow(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var kir: Sessionkey;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var kir: Sessionkey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), {ni}kir, nr );
|
||||
send_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
|
||||
send_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
read_3 (R,I, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), {ni}kir, nr );
|
||||
send_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_5 (I, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_6 (I, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_7 (I, Secret, kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_5 (I, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_6 (I, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_7 (I, Secret, kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var kir: Sessionkey;
|
||||
var T;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var kir: Sessionkey;
|
||||
var T;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3 (R,I, T, {ni}kir, nr );
|
||||
read_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
|
||||
read_2 (S,R, T, { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3 (R,I, T, {ni}kir, nr );
|
||||
read_4 (I,R, {nr}kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_8 (R, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_9 (R, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_10 (R, Secret, kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_8 (R, Nisynch);
|
||||
claim_9 (R, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_10 (R, Secret, kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const kir: Sessionkey;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const kir: Sessionkey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_1 (I,S, I,R,ni);
|
||||
send_2 (S,R, {I,R,ni,kir}k(I,S), { I,R,ni,kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -25,58 +25,58 @@ compromised k(e,s);
|
||||
|
||||
protocol kslLowe(A,B,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role A
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Na, Ma: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nc, Mb: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
role A
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Na, Ma: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nc, Mb: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(A,B, Na, A);
|
||||
read_4(B,A, { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S), T, Nc, {B,Na}Kab );
|
||||
send_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
|
||||
send_1(A,B, Na, A);
|
||||
read_4(B,A, { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S), T, Nc, {B,Na}Kab );
|
||||
send_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
|
||||
|
||||
send_6(A,B, Ma,T );
|
||||
read_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma, B}Kab );
|
||||
send_8(A,B, {A,Mb}Kab );
|
||||
send_6(A,B, Ma,T );
|
||||
read_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma, B}Kab );
|
||||
send_8(A,B, {A,Mb}Kab );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
|
||||
claim_A2(A,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_A3(A,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
|
||||
claim_A2(A,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_A3(A,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role B
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Na,Ma: Nonce;
|
||||
const Nb,Nc,Mb: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
const Kbb: TicketKey;
|
||||
const Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
role B
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Na,Ma: Nonce;
|
||||
const Nb,Nc,Mb: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
const Kbb: TicketKey;
|
||||
const Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(A,B, Na, A);
|
||||
send_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B );
|
||||
read_3(S,B, { A, Nb, Kab }k(B,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(B,A, T, { Tb, A, Kab }Kbb, Nc, {B, Na}Kab );
|
||||
read_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
|
||||
read_1(A,B, Na, A);
|
||||
send_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B );
|
||||
read_3(S,B, { A, Nb, Kab }k(B,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(B,A, T, { Tb, A, Kab }Kbb, Nc, {B, Na}Kab );
|
||||
read_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
|
||||
|
||||
read_6(A,B, Ma,{ Tb, A, Kab }Kbb );
|
||||
send_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma,B}Kab );
|
||||
read_8(A,B, {A,Mb}Kab );
|
||||
read_6(A,B, Ma,{ Tb, A, Kab }Kbb );
|
||||
send_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma,B}Kab );
|
||||
read_8(A,B, {A,Mb}Kab );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab);
|
||||
claim_B2(B,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_B3(B,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab);
|
||||
claim_B2(B,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_B3(B,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Na, Nb: Nonce;
|
||||
const Kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Na, Nb: Nonce;
|
||||
const Kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B );
|
||||
send_3(S,B, { A, Nb, Kab }k(B,S), { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B );
|
||||
send_3(S,B, { A, Nb, Kab }k(B,S), { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
run kslLowe.A(a,b,s);
|
||||
|
@ -22,58 +22,58 @@ compromised k(e,s);
|
||||
|
||||
protocol ksl(A,B,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role A
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Na, Ma: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nc, Mb: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
role A
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Na, Ma: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nc, Mb: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(A,B, Na, A);
|
||||
read_4(B,A, { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S), T, Nc, {Na}Kab );
|
||||
send_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
|
||||
send_1(A,B, Na, A);
|
||||
read_4(B,A, { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S), T, Nc, {Na}Kab );
|
||||
send_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
|
||||
|
||||
send_6(A,B, Ma,T );
|
||||
read_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma}Kab );
|
||||
send_8(A,B, {Mb}Kab );
|
||||
send_6(A,B, Ma,T );
|
||||
read_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma}Kab );
|
||||
send_8(A,B, {Mb}Kab );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
|
||||
claim_A2(A,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_A3(A,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_A1(A,Secret, Kab);
|
||||
claim_A2(A,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_A3(A,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role B
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Na,Ma: Nonce;
|
||||
const Nb,Nc,Mb: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
const Kbb: TicketKey;
|
||||
const Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
role B
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Na,Ma: Nonce;
|
||||
const Nb,Nc,Mb: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
const Kbb: TicketKey;
|
||||
const Tb: GeneralizedTimestamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(A,B, Na, A);
|
||||
send_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B );
|
||||
read_3(S,B, { Nb, A, Kab }k(B,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(B,A, T, { Tb, A, Kab }Kbb, Nc, {Na}Kab );
|
||||
read_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
|
||||
read_1(A,B, Na, A);
|
||||
send_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B );
|
||||
read_3(S,B, { Nb, A, Kab }k(B,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(B,A, T, { Tb, A, Kab }Kbb, Nc, {Na}Kab );
|
||||
read_5(A,B, { Nc }Kab );
|
||||
|
||||
read_6(A,B, Ma,{ Tb, A, Kab }Kbb );
|
||||
send_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma}Kab );
|
||||
read_8(A,B, {Mb}Kab );
|
||||
read_6(A,B, Ma,{ Tb, A, Kab }Kbb );
|
||||
send_7(B,A, Mb,{Ma}Kab );
|
||||
read_8(A,B, {Mb}Kab );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab);
|
||||
claim_B2(B,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_B3(B,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_B1(B,Secret, Kab);
|
||||
claim_B2(B,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_B3(B,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Na, Nb: Nonce;
|
||||
const Kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Na, Nb: Nonce;
|
||||
const Kab: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B );
|
||||
send_3(S,B, { Nb, A, Kab }k(B,S), { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_2(B,S, Na, A, Nb, B );
|
||||
send_3(S,B, { Nb, A, Kab }k(B,S), { Na,B,Kab }k(A,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
run ksl.A(a,b,s);
|
||||
|
@ -16,22 +16,22 @@ inversekeys(pk,sk);
|
||||
|
||||
protocol needhamschroederpkLowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, (I,R));
|
||||
send_1(I,S, (I,R));
|
||||
read_2(S,I, {pk(R), R}sk(S));
|
||||
send_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R));
|
||||
read_6(R,I, {Ni,Nr,R}pk(I));
|
||||
send_7(I,R, {Nr}pk(R));
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Ni);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Nr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ protocol needhamschroederpkLowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{Nr}pk(R));
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Nr);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Secret,Ni);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ usertype Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol needhamschroederskamend(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
@ -40,10 +40,10 @@ protocol needhamschroederskamend(I,R,S)
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ protocol needhamschroederskamend(I,R,S)
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Nr);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
@ -19,24 +19,24 @@ usertype Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni));
|
||||
send_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni));
|
||||
read_2(S,I, {Ni,R,Kir,T}k(I,S));
|
||||
send_3(I,R,T);
|
||||
read_4(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
send_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
|
||||
read_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
@ -16,22 +16,22 @@ inversekeys(pk,sk);
|
||||
|
||||
protocol needhamschroederpk(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S,(I,R));
|
||||
send_1(I,S,(I,R));
|
||||
read_2(S,I, {pk(R), R}sk(S));
|
||||
send_3(I,R,{Ni,I}pk(R));
|
||||
read_6(R,I, {Ni, Nr}pk(I));
|
||||
send_7(I,R, {Nr}pk(R));
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Ni);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Nr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ protocol needhamschroederpk(I,R,S)
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{Nr}pk(R));
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Nr);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Secret,Ni);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
@ -25,55 +25,55 @@ compromised k(e,s);
|
||||
|
||||
protocol neustubHwang(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni,Mi: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr,Mr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni,Mi: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr,Mr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
send_5(I,R,Mi,T);
|
||||
read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
|
||||
const Nr,Mr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
const Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
|
||||
const Nr,Mr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
const Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
read_5(I,R,Mi,T);
|
||||
send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
const Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
const Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
run neustubHwang.A(a,b,s);
|
||||
|
@ -22,55 +22,55 @@ compromised k(e,s);
|
||||
|
||||
protocol neustub(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni,Mi: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr,Mr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni,Mi: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr,Mr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, { R,Ni,Kir,Tb}k(I,S), T, Nr);
|
||||
send_4(I,R,T,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
send_5(I,R,Mi,T);
|
||||
read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
read_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
|
||||
const Nr,Mr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
const Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
|
||||
const Nr,Mr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
const Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I, Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, {I, Ni, Tb}k(R,S),Nr);
|
||||
read_4(I,R,{I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
read_5(I,R,Mi,T);
|
||||
send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
send_6(R,I,Mr,{Mi}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R,{Mr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
|
||||
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
const Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
const Kir: SessionKey;
|
||||
var Tb: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);
|
||||
send_3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Tb}k(R,S), Nr);
|
||||
send_3(S,I, { R, Ni, Kir, Tb}k(I,S), { I,Kir,Tb}k(R,S),Nr );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
run neustub.A(a,b,s);
|
||||
|
@ -16,44 +16,44 @@ usertype String,SessionKey,Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol otwayrees(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni : Nonce;
|
||||
const M : String;
|
||||
var Kir : SessionKey;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni : Nonce;
|
||||
const M : String;
|
||||
var Kir : SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, M,I,R,{Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,I, M,{Ni,Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_1(I,R, M,I,R,{Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,I, M,{Ni,Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
#claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var M : String;
|
||||
const Nr : Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir : SessionKey;
|
||||
var T1,T2: Ticket;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var M : String;
|
||||
const Nr : Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir : SessionKey;
|
||||
var T1,T2: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, M,I,R, T1 );
|
||||
send_2(R,S, M,I,R, T1, { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_3(S,R, M, T2, { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_4(R,I, M, T2 );
|
||||
read_1(I,R, M,I,R, T1 );
|
||||
send_2(R,S, M,I,R, T1, { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_3(S,R, M, T2, { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_4(R,I, M, T2 );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
#claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni,Nr : Nonce;
|
||||
var M : String;
|
||||
const Kir : SessionKey;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ni,Nr : Nonce;
|
||||
var M : String;
|
||||
const Kir : SessionKey;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, M,I,R, { Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S), { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,R, M, { Ni,Kir }k(I,S) , { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_2(R,S, M,I,R, { Ni,M,I,R}k(I,S), { Nr,M,I,R }k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,R, M, { Ni,Kir }k(I,S) , { Nr,Kir }k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice, Bob, Eve, Simon: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ const Vor: XorKey;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol smartright(I,R)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const VoKey: SessionKey;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const VoKey: SessionKey;
|
||||
const VoR: XorKey;
|
||||
const CW;
|
||||
var VoRi: Nonce;
|
||||
@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ protocol smartright(I,R)
|
||||
send_1(I,R, {VoKey,{CW}VoR}k(I,R));
|
||||
read_2(R,I, VoRi);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, VoR, {{VoRi}hash}VoKey);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var VoR: XorKey;
|
||||
var VoKey: SessionKey;
|
||||
@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ protocol smartright(I,R)
|
||||
send_2(R,I, VoRi);
|
||||
read_3(I,R, VoR,{{VoRi}hash}VoKey);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -21,50 +21,50 @@ inversekeys (inc,dec);
|
||||
protocol spliceASCJ(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N1,N2: Nonce;
|
||||
const T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
const L: LifeTime;
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N1,N2: Nonce;
|
||||
const T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
const L: LifeTime;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
read_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
read_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_9(I, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_10(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_9(I, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_10(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var N1,N3: Nonce;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var N1,N3: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N3: Nonce;
|
||||
var N2: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var L: LifeTime;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N3: Nonce;
|
||||
var N2: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var L: LifeTime;
|
||||
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I, R, {T, L, {I, N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_6(R,I, R, I, {{N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_11(R, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_12(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_11(R, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_12(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -16,50 +16,50 @@ inversekeys (inc,dec);
|
||||
protocol spliceASHC(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N1,N2: Nonce;
|
||||
const T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
const L: LifeTime;
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N1,N2: Nonce;
|
||||
const T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
const L: LifeTime;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
read_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
read_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_9(I, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_10(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_9(I, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_10(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var N1,N3: Nonce;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var N1,N3: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, R, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N3: Nonce;
|
||||
var N2: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var L: LifeTime;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N3: Nonce;
|
||||
var N2: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var L: LifeTime;
|
||||
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, I, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_11(R, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_12(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_11(R, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_12(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -21,50 +21,50 @@ inversekeys (inc,dec);
|
||||
protocol spliceAS(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N1,N2: Nonce;
|
||||
const T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
const L: LifeTime;
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N1,N2: Nonce;
|
||||
const T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
const L: LifeTime;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
read_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
read_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
read_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_9(I, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_10(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_7(I, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_9(I, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_10(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var N1,N3: Nonce;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var N1,N3: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I, R, N1 );
|
||||
send_2(S,I, S, {S, I, N1, pk(R)}sk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
send_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N3: Nonce;
|
||||
var N2: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var L: LifeTime;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N3: Nonce;
|
||||
var N2: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var L: LifeTime;
|
||||
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var ni: Nonce;
|
||||
const nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
read_3(I,R, I, R, {I, T, L, {N2}pk(R)}sk(I) );
|
||||
send_4(R,S, R, I, N3 );
|
||||
read_5(S,R, S, {S, R, N3, pk(I)}sk(S) );
|
||||
send_6(R,I, R, I, {R, {N2}inc}pk(I) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_11(R, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_12(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_8(R, Secret, N2);
|
||||
claim_11(R, Niagree);
|
||||
claim_12(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -12,37 +12,37 @@ inversekeys(pk,sk);
|
||||
|
||||
protocol tmn(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ki: Key;
|
||||
var Kr: Key;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ki: Key;
|
||||
var Kr: Key;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
|
||||
send_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
|
||||
read_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Ki);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Ki);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Secret,Kr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kr: Key;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kr: Key;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(S,R, I );
|
||||
send_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
|
||||
read_2(S,R, I );
|
||||
send_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ki,Kr: Key;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ki,Kr: Key;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
|
||||
send_2(S,R, I );
|
||||
read_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
|
||||
send_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_1(I,S, R,{Ki}pk(S) );
|
||||
send_2(S,R, I );
|
||||
read_3(R,S, I, { Kr }pk(S) );
|
||||
send_4(S,I, R,{Kr}Ki );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -18,44 +18,44 @@ secret k: Function;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol wmfLowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
const Ti: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Kr: Key;
|
||||
var Kr: Key;
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
|
||||
read_3(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||||
send_4(I,R,{{Nr}succ}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ts: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {{Nr}succ}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
const Ts: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Ti: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -11,37 +11,37 @@ secret k: Function;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol wmf(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
const Ti: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Kr: Key;
|
||||
var Kr: Key;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
|
||||
send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Ts: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
const Ts: TimeStamp;
|
||||
var Ti: TimeStamp;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -14,18 +14,18 @@ secret k: Function;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol woolamPi1(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -36,15 +36,15 @@ protocol woolamPi1(I,R,S)
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {I,R, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {I,R,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -14,18 +14,18 @@ secret k: Function;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol woolamPi2(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {I,Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -36,15 +36,15 @@ protocol woolamPi2(I,R,S)
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {I, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I, {I,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {I,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -14,18 +14,18 @@ secret k: Function;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol woolamPi3(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -36,15 +36,15 @@ protocol woolamPi3(I,R,S)
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {I, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I, {Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {I,Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -14,18 +14,18 @@ secret k: Function;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol woolamPif(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {I,R,Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -36,15 +36,15 @@ protocol woolamPif(I,R,S)
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {I, R, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I, R, Nr,{I,R,Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {I, R, Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -18,18 +18,18 @@ secret k: Function;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol woolamPi(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, Nr);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -40,15 +40,15 @@ protocol woolamPi(I,R,S)
|
||||
read_5(S,R, {Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I,{Nr}k(I,S)}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {Nr}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -16,25 +16,25 @@ secret k: Function;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol woolam(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N1: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
var N2: Nonce;
|
||||
var N2: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I, N1);
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I, N1);
|
||||
read_2(R,I, R, N2);
|
||||
send_3(I,R, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S));
|
||||
read_6(R,I, {R, N1, N2, Kir}k(I,S), {N1,N2}Kir);
|
||||
send_7(I,R, {N2}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const N2: Nonce;
|
||||
var N1: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
@ -48,18 +48,18 @@ protocol woolam(I,R,S)
|
||||
send_6(R,I, T2, {N1,N2}Kir);
|
||||
read_7(I,R, {N2}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
var N1,N2: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_4(R,S, {I, R, N1, N2}k(I,S), {I, R, N1, N2}k(R,S));
|
||||
send_5(S,R, {R, N1, N2, Kir}k(I,S), {I, N1, N2, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -15,44 +15,44 @@ usertype Ticket, Key;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol yahalomBAN(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {I,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {I,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), {I,Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), {I,Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Simon : Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -12,44 +12,44 @@ usertype Key;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol yahalomLowe(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir );
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S) );
|
||||
send_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(S,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir);
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(S,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
read_5(I,R, {I, R, S, Nr}Kir);
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
read_2(R,S, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S));
|
||||
send_4(S,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Simon : Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -15,44 +15,44 @@ usertype Ticket, Key;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol yahalomPaulson(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {I,R, Kir, Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {I,R, Kir, Nr}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), {I,R,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, Nr, {I,Ni}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, Nr, {R,Kir,Ni}k(I,S), {I,R,Kir,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Simon : Agent;
|
||||
|
@ -15,44 +15,44 @@ usertype Ticket, Key;
|
||||
|
||||
protocol yahalom(I,R,S)
|
||||
{
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
role I
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
send_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
read_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), T );
|
||||
send_4(I,R, T, {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
claim_I1(I, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_I2(I, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
role R
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
var Ni: Nonce;
|
||||
var T: Ticket;
|
||||
var Kir: Key;
|
||||
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
read_1(I,R, I,Ni);
|
||||
send_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
read_4(I,R, {I,Kir}k(R,S) , {Nr}Kir );
|
||||
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R1(R, Secret,Kir);
|
||||
claim_R2(R, Nisynch);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
role S
|
||||
{
|
||||
const Kir: Key;
|
||||
var Ni,Nr: Nonce;
|
||||
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), {I,Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
read_2(R,S, R, {I,Ni,Nr}k(R,S) );
|
||||
send_3(S,I, {R,Kir,Ni,Nr}k(I,S), {I,Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const Alice,Bob,Simon : Agent;
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user