diff --git a/spdl/SPORE/ccitt509-3.spdl b/spdl/SPORE/ccitt509-3.spdl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c42bba0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/spdl/SPORE/ccitt509-3.spdl
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# CCITT X.509 (3)
+#
+# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
+# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/ccittx509_3.html
+#
+# Note:
+# The protocol description also states that Xa and Ya should be fresh
+# this can not be verified using scyther
+#
+
+const pk: Function;
+secret sk: Function;
+inversekeys(pk,sk);
+usertype Timestamp;
+
+protocol ccitt5093(I,R)
+{
+	role I
+	{
+		const Ta: Timestamp;
+        var Tb: Timestamp;
+        const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
+        var Xb,Nb,Yb: Nonce;
+		send_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
+        read_2(R,I, R,{Tb, Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
+        send_3(I,R, I, {Nb}sk(I));
+        claim_4(I,Nisynch);
+	}	
+	
+	role R
+	{
+		var Ta: Timestamp;
+        const Tb: Timestamp;
+        var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
+        const Xb,Yb,Nb: Nonce;
+
+		read_1(I,R, I,{Ta, Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
+        send_2(R,I, R,{Tb, Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
+        read_3(I,R, I, {Nb}sk(I));
+		claim_5(R,Nisynch);
+        # There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here
+	}
+}
+
+const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
+
+untrusted Eve;
+const ne: Nonce;
+const te: Timestamp;
+compromised sk(Eve);
+
+# This scenario should find the attack described in SPORE
+# run ccitt5093.I(Alice,Bob);
+# run ccitt5093.I(Alice,Eve);
+# run ccitt5093.R(Alice,Bob);
+
+# General scenario, 2 parallel runs of the protocol
+ 
+run ccitt5093.I(Agent,Agent);
+run ccitt5093.R(Agent,Agent);
+run ccitt5093.I(Agent,Agent);
+run ccitt5093.R(Agent,Agent);
diff --git a/spdl/SPORE/ccitt509-ban3.spdl b/spdl/SPORE/ccitt509-ban3.spdl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d01a089
--- /dev/null
+++ b/spdl/SPORE/ccitt509-ban3.spdl
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# BAN modified version of CCITT X.509 (3)
+#
+# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
+# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/ccittx509_3BAN.html
+#
+# Note:
+# The protocol description also states that Xa and Ya should be fresh
+# this can not be verified using scyther
+# 
+# Note:
+# According to SPORE there are no known attacks on this protocol
+#
+
+const pk: Function;
+secret sk: Function;
+inversekeys(pk,sk);
+
+protocol ccitt509ban3(I,R)
+{
+	role I
+	{
+        const Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
+        var Xb,Nb,Yb: Nonce;
+
+		send_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
+        read_2(R,I, R,{Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
+        send_3(I,R, I,{R, Nb}sk(I));
+        claim_4(I,Nisynch);
+	}	
+	
+	role R
+	{
+        var Na,Xa,Ya: Nonce;
+        const Xb,Yb,Nb: Nonce;
+
+		read_1(I,R, I,{Na, R, Xa,{Ya}pk(R)}sk(I));
+        send_2(R,I, R,{Nb, I, Na, Xb,{Yb}pk(I)}sk(R));
+        read_3(I,R, I,{R, Nb}sk(I));
+		claim_5(R,Nisynch);
+        # There should also be Fresh Xa and Fresh Ya claims here
+	}
+}
+
+const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
+
+untrusted Eve;
+const ne: Nonce;
+compromised sk(Eve);
+
+# General scenario, 2 parallel runs of the protocol
+ 
+run ccitt509ban3.I(Agent,Agent);
+run ccitt509ban3.R(Agent,Agent);
+run ccitt509ban3.I(Agent,Agent);
+run ccitt509ban3.R(Agent,Agent);