scyther/protocols/misc/tls/tls-HSDDM05-2.cpp

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/*
* This is an improved model of a version of the TLS protocol as modeled by
* He,Sundararajan,Datta,Derek and Mitchell in the paper: "A modular
* correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS".
*
* Modeled by: Cas Cremers
*
* The original model was broken: the secret was not part of the
* handshake, and the handshakes were not hashed. After an e-mail
* exchange with Anupam Datta this was cleared up.
*
* The .cpp file cannot be fed into scyther directly; rather, one needs
* to type: (for *nix type systems with cpp)
*
* cpp tls-HSDDM05-2.cpp >tls-HSDDM05-2.spdl
*
* in order to generate a valid spdl file for the Scyther.
*
* This allows for macro expansion, as seen in the next part, which is
* particularly useful for expanding the handshakes.
*
*/
#define CERT(a) { a,pk(a) }sk(Terence)
#define msg1 X,Nx,pa
#define msg2 Ny,pb,CERT(Y)
#define handShake1 hash(msg1,msg2,msecret)
#define msg3 CERT(X),{handShake1}sk(X),{msecret}pk(Y),hash(msecret,handShake1,clientstring)
#define handShake2 hash(msg1,msg2,msg3)
#define msg4 hash(msecret,handShake2,serverstring)
/* below is just Scyther input and no further macro definitions */
usertype Params, String;
const pk,hash: Function;
secret sk,unhash: Function;
inversekeys(pk,sk);
inversekeys(hash,unhash);
const clientstring,serverstring: String;
const Alice, Bob, Eve: Agent;
const Terence: Agent;
protocol tls-HSDDM05(X,Y)
{
role X
{
fresh Nx: Nonce;
fresh msecret: Nonce;
fresh pa: Params;
var Ny: Nonce;
var pb: Params;
send_1( X,Y, msg1 );
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recv_2( Y,X, msg2 );
send_3( X,Y, msg3 );
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recv_4( Y,X, msg4 );
claim_X1( X, Secret, msecret );
}
role Y
{
var Nx: Nonce;
var msecret: Nonce;
var pa: Params;
fresh Ny: Nonce;
fresh pb: Params;
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recv_1( X,Y, msg1 );
send_2( Y,X, msg2 );
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recv_3( X,Y, msg3 );
send_4( Y,X, msg4 );
claim_Y1( Y, Secret, msecret );
}
}