scyther/src/prune_theorems.c

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/**
*
*@file prune_theorems.c
*
* Prune stuff based on theorems.
* Pruning leaves complete results.
*
*/
#include "system.h"
#include "list.h"
#include "switches.h"
#include "binding.h"
#include "specialterm.h"
extern Protocol INTRUDER;
extern int proofDepth;
extern int max_encryption_level;
//! Prune determination because of theorems
/**
* When something is pruned because of this function, the state space is still
* considered to be complete.
*
*@returns true iff this state is invalid because of a theorem
*/
int
prune_theorems (const System sys)
{
Termlist tl;
List bl;
int run;
// Check all types of the local agents according to the matching type
if (!checkAllSubstitutions (sys))
{
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf
("Pruned because some local variable was incorrectly subsituted.\n");
}
return 1;
}
// Check if all actors are agents for responders (initiators come next)
run = 0;
while (run < sys->maxruns)
{
if (!sys->runs[run].role->initiator)
{
Term actor;
actor = agentOfRun (sys, run);
if (!goodAgentType (actor))
{
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf ("Pruned because the actor ");
termPrint (actor);
eprintf (" of run %i is not of a compatible type.\n", run);
}
return 1;
}
}
run++;
}
// Prune if any initiator run talks to itself
/**
* This effectively disallows Alice from talking to Alice, for all
* initiators. We still allow it for responder runs, because we assume the
* responder is not checking this.
*/
if (switches.extravert)
{
int run;
run = 0;
while (run < sys->maxruns)
{
// Check this run only if it is an initiator role
if (sys->runs[run].role->initiator)
{
// Check this initiator run
Termlist tl;
tl = sys->runs[run].agents;
while (tl != NULL)
{
Termlist tlscan;
tlscan = tl->next;
while (tlscan != NULL)
{
if (isTermEqual (tl->term, tlscan->term))
{
// XXX TODO
// Still need to fix proof output for this
//
// Pruning because some agents are equal for this role.
return 1;
}
tlscan = tlscan->next;
}
tl = tl->next;
}
run++;
}
}
}
// Prune wrong agents type for initators
if (!initiatorAgentsType ())
{
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf
("Pruned: an initiator role does not have the correct type for one of its agents.\n");
}
return 1;
}
// Check if all agents of the main run are valid
if (!isRunTrusted (sys, 0))
{
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf
("Pruned because all agents of the claim run must be trusted.\n");
}
return 1;
}
// Check if the actors of all other runs are not untrusted
if (sys->untrusted != NULL)
{
int run;
run = 1;
while (run < sys->maxruns)
{
if (sys->runs[run].protocol != INTRUDER)
{
if (sys->runs[run].agents != NULL)
{
Term actor;
actor = agentOfRun (sys, run);
if (actor == NULL)
{
error ("Agent of run %i is NULL", run);
}
if (!isAgentTrusted (sys, actor))
{
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf
("Pruned because the actor of run %i is untrusted.\n",
run);
}
return 1;
}
}
else
{
Protocol p;
globalError++;
eprintf ("Run %i: ", run);
role_name_print (run);
eprintf (" has an empty agents list.\n");
eprintf ("protocol->rolenames: ");
p = (Protocol) sys->runs[run].protocol;
termlistPrint (p->rolenames);
eprintf ("\n");
error ("Aborting.");
globalError--;
return 1;
}
}
run++;
}
}
// Check for c-minimality
{
if (!bindings_c_minimal ())
{
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf ("Pruned because this is not <=c-minimal.\n");
}
return 1;
}
}
/**
* Check whether the bindings are valid
*/
bl = sys->bindings;
while (bl != NULL)
{
Binding b;
b = bl->data;
// Check for "Hidden" interm goals
if (termInTerm (b->term, TERM_Hidden))
{
// Prune the state: we can never meet this
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf ("Pruned because intruder can never construnct ");
termPrint (b->term);
eprintf ("\n");
}
return 1;
}
// Check for encryption levels
/*
* if (switches.match < 2
*/
if (term_encryption_level (b->term) > max_encryption_level)
{
// Prune: we do not need to construct such terms
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf ("Pruned because the encryption level of ");
termPrint (b->term);
eprintf (" is too high.\n");
}
return 1;
}
// Check for SK-type function occurrences
//!@todo Needs a LEMMA, although this seems to be quite straightforward to prove.
// The idea is that functions are never sent as a whole, but only used in applications.
if (isTermFunctionName (b->term))
{
if (!inKnowledge (sys->know, b->term))
{
// Not in initial knowledge of the intruder
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf ("Pruned because the function ");
termPrint (b->term);
eprintf (" is not known initially to the intruder.\n");
}
return 1;
}
}
bl = bl->next;
}
/* check for singular roles */
run = 0;
while (run < sys->maxruns)
{
if (sys->runs[run].role->singular)
{
// This is a singular role: it therefore should not occur later on again.
int run2;
Term rolename;
rolename = sys->runs[run].role->nameterm;
run2 = run + 1;
while (run2 < sys->maxruns)
{
Term rolename2;
rolename2 = sys->runs[run2].role->nameterm;
if (isTermEqual (rolename, rolename2))
{
// This is not allowed: the singular role occurs twice in the semitrace.
// Thus we prune.
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf ("Pruned because the singular role ");
termPrint (rolename);
eprintf (" occurs more than once in the semitrace.\n");
}
return 1;
}
run2++;
}
}
run++;
}
return 0;
}