scyther/gui/Protocols/IKE/ikev2-sig-child.cpp

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/**********************************************************************
* @protocol Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2)
* @reference RFC 4306
* @variant Combination of signature authenticated IKEv2 and
* CREATE_CHILD_SA, includes optional payloads
**********************************************************************/
/**
* MACRO DEFINITIONS
* Needs preprocessing by cpp before fed to scyther
*/
#define __IKEV2__
#ifndef __ORACLE__
#include "common.h"
#endif
#define AUTHii {SPIi, O, SA1, g(i), Ni, Nr, prf(SKi, I)}sk(I)
#define AUTHir {SPIi, O, SA1, Gi, Ni, Nr, prf(SKr, I)}sk(I)
#define AUTHri {SPIi, SPIr, SA1, Gr, Nr, Ni, prf(SKi, R)}sk(R)
#define AUTHrr {SPIi, SPIr, SA1, g(r), Nr, Ni, prf(SKr, R)}sk(R)
#define KEYMATi KDF(Ni, Nr, Zi, h(Gt,j), Mi, Mr)
#define KEYMATr KDF(Ni, Nr, Zr, h(Gi,t), Mi, Mr)
usertype Number, SecurityAssociation, TrafficSelector;
const O: Number;
const SA1 ,SA2, SA3: SecurityAssociation;
const TSi, TSr: TrafficSelector;
/**
* This role serves as an "oracle" to ensure the executability of the
* protocol by taking care of the problems that arise from our way of
* modelling Diffie-Hellman keys.
*/
protocol @executability(E) {
#define Gi g(i)
#define Gr g(r)
role E {
var i, j, r, t, Mi, Ni, Mr, Nr, SPIi, SPIr: Nonce;
var I, R: Agent;
// msg 3
recv_!E1( E, E, {I, R, AUTHii, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
send_!E2( E, E, {I, R, AUTHir, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
// msg 4
recv_!E3( E, E, {R, AUTHrr, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
send_!E4( E, E, {R, AUTHri, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
// msg 5
recv_!E5( E, E, {SA3, Mi, g(j), TSi, TSr}SKi );
send_!E6( E, E, {SA3, Mi, g(j), TSi, TSr}SKr );
// msg 6
recv_!E7( E, E, {SA3, Mr, g(t), TSi, TSr}SKr );
send_!E8( E, E, {SA3, Mr, g(t), TSi, TSr}SKr );
}
#undef Gi
#undef Gr
}
protocol @ora(S) {
#define Gi g(i)
#define Gj g(j)
#define Gr g(r)
#define Gt g(t)
role S {
var i, j, r, t, Mi, Ni, Mr, Nr, SPIi, SPIr: Nonce;
recv_!S1( S, S, KDF(Ni, Nr, Zi, h(Gt,j), Mi, Mr) );
send_!S2( S, S, KDF(Ni, Nr, Zr, h(Gj,t), Mi, Mr) );
}
#undef Gi
#undef Gj
#undef Gr
#undef Gt
}
protocol ikev2-sig-child(I, R)
{
role I {
fresh i, j, Ni, Mi, SPIi: Nonce;
var Nr, Mr, SPIr: Nonce;
var Gr, Gt: Ticket;
/* IKE_SA_INIT */
send_1( I, R, SPIi, O, SA1, g(i), Ni );
recv_2( R, I, HDR, SA1, Gr, Nr );
/* IKE_AUTH */
send_!3( I, R, HDR, {I, R, AUTHii, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
recv_!4( R, I, HDR, {R, AUTHri, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
/* CREATE_CHILD_SA */
claim( I, Running, R,g(i),g(j),Gr );
send_!5( I, R, HDR, {SA3, Mi, g(j), TSi, TSr}SKi );
recv_!6( R, I, HDR, {SA3, Mr, Gt, TSi, TSr}SKi );
/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
claim( I, SKR, SKi );
claim( I, SKR, KEYMATi );
claim( I, Alive );
claim( I, Weakagree );
claim( I, Commit, R,g(i),g(j),Gr,Gt );
}
role R {
fresh r, t, Nr, Mr, SPIr: Nonce;
var Ni, Mi, SPIi: Nonce;
var Gi, Gj: Ticket;
/* IKE_SA_INIT */
recv_1( I, R, SPIi, O, SA1, Gi, Ni );
send_2( R, I, HDR, SA1, g(r), Nr );
/* IKE_AUTH */
recv_!3( I, R, HDR, {I, R, AUTHir, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
send_!4( R, I, HDR, {R, AUTHrr, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
/* CREATE_CHILD_SA */
recv_!5( I, R, HDR, {SA3, Mi, Gj, TSi, TSr}SKr );
claim( R, Running, I,Gi,Gj,g(r),g(t) );
send_!6( R, I, HDR, {SA3, Mr, g(t), TSi, TSr}SKr );
/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
claim( R, SKR, SKr );
claim( R, SKR, KEYMATr );
claim( R, Alive );
claim( R, Weakagree );
claim( R, Commit, I,Gi,Gj,g(r) );
}
}