scyther/src/prune_bounds.c

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/*
* Scyther : An automatic verifier for security protocols.
* Copyright (C) 2007 Cas Cremers
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
* of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
*/
/**
*
*@file prune_bounds.c
*
* Prune stuff based on bounds
*
*/
#include <limits.h>
#include "termlist.h"
#include "list.h"
#include "switches.h"
#include "timer.h"
#include "arachne.h"
#include "system.h"
#include "termmap.h"
#include "cost.h"
extern int attack_length;
extern int attack_leastcost;
extern Protocol INTRUDER;
extern int proofDepth;
extern int max_encryption_level;
//! Forward declarations
int tooManyOfRole (const System sys);
//! Prune determination for bounds
/**
* When something is pruned here, the state space is not complete anymore.
*
*@returns true iff this state is invalid for some reason
*/
int
prune_bounds (const System sys)
{
/* prune for time */
if (passed_time_limit ())
{
// Oh no, we ran out of time!
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf ("Pruned: ran out of allowed time (-T %i switch)\n",
get_time_limit ());
}
// Pruned because of time bound!
sys->current_claim->timebound = 1;
return 1;
}
/* prune for number of attacks if we are actually outputting them */
if (enoughAttacks (sys))
{
// Oh no, we ran out of possible attacks!
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf
("Pruned: we already found the maximum number of attacks.\n");
}
return 1;
}
/* prune for proof depth */
if (proofDepth > switches.maxproofdepth)
{
// Hardcoded limit on proof tree depth
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf ("Pruned: proof tree too deep: %i (-d %i switch)\n",
proofDepth, switches.maxproofdepth);
}
return 1;
}
/* prune for trace length */
if (switches.maxtracelength < INT_MAX)
{
int tracelength;
int run;
/* compute trace length of current semistate */
tracelength = 0;
run = 0;
while (run < sys->maxruns)
{
/* ignore intruder actions */
if (sys->runs[run].protocol != INTRUDER)
{
tracelength = tracelength + sys->runs[run].step;
}
run++;
}
/* test */
if (tracelength > switches.maxtracelength)
{
// Hardcoded limit on proof tree depth
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf ("Pruned: trace too long: %i (-l %i switch)\n",
tracelength, switches.maxtracelength);
}
return 1;
}
}
/* prune for runs */
if (sys->num_regular_runs > switches.runs)
{
// Hardcoded limit on runs
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf ("Pruned: too many regular runs (%i).\n",
sys->num_regular_runs);
}
return 1;
}
/* prune for role instances max */
if (tooManyOfRole (sys))
{
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf ("Pruned: too many instances of a particular role.\n");
}
return 1;
}
// This needs some foundation. Probably * 2^max_encryption_level
//!@todo Remove later
/**
* This should be removed once the hidelevel lemma works correctly
*/
if (switches.experimental & 1)
{
if ((switches.match < 2)
&& (sys->num_intruder_runs >
((double) switches.runs * max_encryption_level * 8)))
{
// Hardcoded limit on iterations
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf
("Pruned: %i intruder runs is too much. (max encr. level %i)\n",
sys->num_intruder_runs, max_encryption_level);
}
return 1;
}
}
// Limit on exceeding any attack length
if (get_semitrace_length () >= attack_length)
{
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf ("Pruned: attack length %i.\n", attack_length);
}
return 1;
}
/* prune for cheaper */
if (switches.prune != 0 && attack_leastcost <= attackCost (sys))
{
// We already had an attack at least this cheap.
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf
("Pruned: attack cost exceeds a previously found attack.\n");
}
return 1;
}
// Pruning involving the number of intruder actions
{
// Count intruder actions
int actioncount;
actioncount = countIntruderActions ();
// Limit intruder actions in any case
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if (!switches.intruder)
{
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if (actioncount > 0)
{
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if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf
("Pruned: no intruder allowed.\n",
switches.maxIntruderActions);
}
return 1;
}
}
// Limit on intruder events count
if (actioncount > switches.maxIntruderActions)
{
if (switches.output == PROOF)
{
indentPrint ();
eprintf
("Pruned: more than %i encrypt/decrypt events in the semitrace.\n",
switches.maxIntruderActions);
}
return 1;
}
}
// No pruning because of bounds
return 0;
}
//! Detect when there are too many instances of a certain role
int
tooManyOfRole (const System sys)
{
int toomany;
toomany = false;
if (switches.maxOfRole > 0)
{
Termmap f;
int run;
f = NULL;
for (run = 0; run < sys->maxruns; run++)
{
if (sys->runs[run].protocol != INTRUDER)
{
// maybe this conflicts with equal protocols...? TODO
Term role;
int count;
role = sys->runs[run].role->nameterm;
count = termmapGet (f, role);
if (count == -1)
count = 1;
else
count++;
f = termmapSet (f, role, count);
if (count > switches.maxOfRole)
{
toomany = true;
break;
}
}
}
termmapDelete (f);
}
return toomany;
}