scyther/protocols/SPORE/ksl-lowe.spdl

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2006-11-21 13:42:06 +00:00
# Lowe modified KSL
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/kslLowe.html
#
# Note:
# According to SPORE there are no attacks on this protocol, scyther
# finds one however. This has to be investigated further.
usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
const a, b, e: Agent;
const s: Server;
const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function;
const ne: Nonce;
const kee: SessionKey;
untrusted e;
compromised k(e,s);
protocol ksl-Lowe^KeyCompromise(C)
{
// Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
role C {
const Ni,Nr,Nc,Ma,Mb: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey;
const Kbb: TicketKey;
const Tr: ExpiredTimeStamp;
var I,R,S: Agent;
read_!C1(C,C, I,R,S);
send_!C2(C,C, (Ni,I),
2006-11-21 13:42:06 +00:00
(Ni,I,Nr,R),
{I,Nr,Kir}k(R,S),{Ni,R,Kir}k(I,S),
{Tr,I,Kir}Kbb,Nc,{R,Ni}k(I,R),
{Nc}Kir,
Ma,
Mb,{Ma,R}Kir,
{I,Mb}Kir,
Kir,
Kbb
);
claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
claim_C4(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kbb));
}
}
protocol ksl-Lowe(I,R,S)
{
role I
{
const Ni, Mi: Nonce;
var Nc, Mr: Nonce;
var T: Ticket;
var Kir: SessionKey;
send_1(I,R, Ni, I);
read_4(R,I, { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S), T, Nc, {R,Ni}Kir );
send_5(I,R, { Nc }Kir );
send_6(I,R, Mi,T );
read_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi, R}Kir );
send_8(I,R, {I,Mr}Kir );
claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
claim_I2(I,Niagree);
claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
claim_I4(I,Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
}
role R
{
var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
const Nr,Nc,Mr: Nonce;
var Kir: SessionKey;
const Kbb: TicketKey;
const Tr: TimeStamp;
var T: Ticket;
read_1(I,R, Ni, I);
send_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
read_3(S,R, { I, Nr, Kir }k(R,S), T );
send_4(R,I, T, { Tr, I, Kir }Kbb, Nc, {R, Ni}Kir );
read_5(I,R, { Nc }Kir );
read_6(I,R, Mi,{ Tr, I, Kir }Kbb );
send_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi,R}Kir );
read_8(I,R, {I,Mr}Kir );
claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
claim_R2(R,Niagree);
claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
claim_R4(R,Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
}
role S
{
var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
const Kir: SessionKey;
read_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
send_3(S,R, { I, Nr, Kir }k(R,S), { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S) );
}
}