77 lines
1.2 KiB
Plaintext
77 lines
1.2 KiB
Plaintext
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const pk: Function;
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secret sk: Function;
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inversekeys (pk,sk);
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protocol ns3(I,R)
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{
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role I
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{
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const ni: Nonce;
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var nr: Nonce;
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send_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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read_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
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send_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_4(I,Secret,ni,nr);
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claim_6(I,Nisynch);
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}
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role R
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{
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var ni: Nonce;
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const nr: Nonce;
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read_1(I,R, {I,ni}pk(R) );
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send_2(R,I, {ni,nr}pk(I) );
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read_3(I,R, {nr}pk(R) );
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claim_5(R,Secret,ni,nr);
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claim_7(R,Nisynch);
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}
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}
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// We leave out: M (from M_0) and Decryption, because that causes
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// problems with the inverse key.
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protocol I_MALICE (I_F, I_T, I_V, I_R, I_E)
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{
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role I_F {
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var t;
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read_if1 (F,F, t);
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}
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role I_T {
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var t;
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read_it1 (T,T, t);
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send_it2 (T,T, t);
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send_it3 (T,T, t);
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}
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role I_V {
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var t1;
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var t2;
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read_iv1 (V,V, t1);
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read_iv2 (V,V, t2);
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send_iv3 (V,V, (t1,t2));
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}
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role I_R {
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var t1;
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var t2;
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read_ir1 (I_R,I_R, (t1,t2));
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read_ir2 (I_R,I_R, t1);
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send_ir3 (I_R,I_R, t2);
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}
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role I_E {
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var t1;
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var t2;
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read_ie1 (I_E,I_E, t1);
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read_ie2 (I_E,I_E, t2);
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send_ie3 (I_E,I_E, {t1}t2);
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}
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}
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const Alice,Bob,Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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const nc: Nonce;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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run ns3.I(Alice,Eve);
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run ns3.R(Alice,Bob);
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