scyther/spdl/SPORE/key-compromise/needham-schroeder-sk.spdl

# Needham Schroeder Symmetric Key
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/nssk.html
#
#
# Note:
# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
#


secret k: Function;
# Model dec that is invertible by inc
const dec,inc: Function;
inversekeys(dec,inc);
usertype SessionKey;
const Fresh: Function;
const Compromised: Function;

protocol needhamschroederSessionKeyCompromise(C)
{
    // Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
    // corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
    role C {
        const Ni,Nr: Nonce;
        const Kir: SessionKey;
        var I,R,S: Agent;

        read_!C1(C,C,    I,R,S);
        send_!C2(C,C,    (I,R,Ni),
                        {Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S),
                        {Kir,I}k(R,S),
                        {Nr}Kir,
                        {{Nr}dec}Kir,
                        Kir
               );
        claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
    }
}

protocol needhamschroedersk(I,R,S)
{
    role I
    {
        const Ni: Nonce;
        var Nr: Nonce;
        var Kir: SessionKey;
        var T: Ticket;
        
        send_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni));
        read_2(S,I, {Ni,R,Kir,T}k(I,S));
        send_3(I,R,T);
        read_4(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
        send_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
        claim_I2(I,Secret,Kir);
        claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
        claim_I4(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
    }    
    
    role R
    {
        const Nr: Nonce;
        var Kir: SessionKey;
        
        read_3(I,R,{Kir,I}k(R,S));
        send_4(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
        read_5(I,R,{{Nr}dec}Kir);
        claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
        claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
        claim_R4(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
    }

    role S
    {
        var Ni: Nonce;
        const Kir: SessionKey;
        read_1(I,S,(I,R,Ni));
        send_2(S,I,{Ni,R,Kir,{Kir,I}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
    }
}

const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;

untrusted Eve;
const ne: Nonce;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);