105 lines
2.4 KiB
C++
105 lines
2.4 KiB
C++
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/** HEADDOC
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* @protocol OAKLEY
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* @reference RFC 2412,
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* Boyd C. and Mathuria A., Protocols for Authentication and
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* Key Agreement
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* @description OAKLEY is related to STS and allows for shared key
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* determination via authenticated Diffie-Hellman exchanges and
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* provides perfect forward secrecy for the shared key.
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* @variant Conservative mode with identity hiding
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**/
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/** MACRO DEFINITIONS
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* Needs preprocessing by cpp before fed to scyther
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**/
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#define __OAKLEY_CONSERVATIVE__
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#ifndef __ORACLE__
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#include "common.h"
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#endif
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#define Kpi prf(Zi)
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#define Kpr prf(Zr)
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#define Kir prf(Ni,Nr)
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usertype String;
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const OK, list, algo: String;
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/**
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* This role serves as an "oracle" to ensure the executability of the
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* protocol by taking care of the problems that arise from our way of
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* modelling Diffie-Hellman keys.
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*/
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protocol @executability(O) {
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#define Gi g(i)
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#define Gr g(r)
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role O {
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var i, r, Ni, Nr, Ci, Cr: Nonce;
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var I, R: Agent;
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// msg 5
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recv_!O1( O, O, {I, R, {Ni}pk(R)}Kpi );
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send_!O2( O, O, {I, R, {Ni}pk(R)}Kpr );
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// msg 6
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recv_!O3( O, O, {{Nr, Ni}pk(I), R, I, prf(Kir, R, I, Gr, g(i), algo)}Kpr );
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send_!O4( O, O, {{Nr, Ni}pk(I), R, I, prf(Kir, R, I, Gr, g(i), algo)}Kpi );
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// msg 7
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recv_!O5( O, O, {prf(Kir, I, R, g(i), Gr, algo)}Kpi );
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send_!O6( O, O, {prf(Kir, I, R, g(i), Gr, algo)}Kpr );
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}
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#undef Gi
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#undef Gr
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}
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protocol oakley-c(I, R)
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{
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role I {
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fresh i, Ni, Ci: Nonce;
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var Nr, Cr: Nonce;
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var Gr: Ticket;
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send_1( I, R, OK );
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recv_2( R, I, Cr );
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send_3( I, R, Ci, Cr, g(i), list );
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recv_4( R, I, Cr, Ci, Gr, algo );
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send_!5( I, R, Ci, Cr, g(i), {I, R, {Ni}pk(R)}Kpi );
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recv_!6( R, I, Cr, Ci, {{Nr, Ni}pk(I), R, I, prf(Kir, R, I, Gr, g(i), algo)}Kpi );
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send_!7( I, R, Ci, Cr, {prf(Kir, I, R, g(i), Gr, algo)}Kpi );
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/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
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claim( I, SKR, Kpi );
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claim( I, SKR, SKi );
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claim( I, Alive );
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claim( I, Weakagree );
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}
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role R {
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fresh r, Nr, Cr: Nonce;
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var Ni, Ci: Nonce;
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var Gi: Ticket;
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recv_1( I, R, OK );
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send_2( R, I, Cr );
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recv_3( I, R, Ci, Cr, Gi, list );
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send_4( R, I, Cr, Ci, g(r), algo );
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recv_!5( I, R, Ci, Cr, Gi, {I, R, {Ni}pk(R)}Kpr );
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send_!6( R, I, Cr, Ci, {{Nr, Ni}pk(I), R, I, prf(Kir, R, I, g(r), Gi, algo)}Kpr );
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recv_!7( I, R, Ci, Cr, {prf(Kir, I, R, Gi, g(r), algo)}Kpr );
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/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
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claim( R, SKR, Kpr );
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claim( R, SKR, SKr );
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claim( R, Alive );
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claim( R, Weakagree );
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}
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}
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