82 lines
1.9 KiB
C++
82 lines
1.9 KiB
C++
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/*
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* This is a model of a version of the TLS protocol as modeled by
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* He,Sundararajan,Datta,Derek and Mitchell in the paper: "A modular
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* correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS".
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*
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* The .cpp file cannot be fed into scyther directly; rather, one needs
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* to type: (for *nix type systems with cpp)
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*
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* cpp tls-mitchell.cpp >tls-mitchell.spdl
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*
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* in order to generate a valid spdl file for the Scyther.
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*
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* This allows for macro expansion, as seen in the next part, which is
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* particularly useful for expanding the handshakes.
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*
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*/
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#define CERT(a) { a,pk(a) }sk(Terence)
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#define handShake1 X,Nx,pa,Ny,pb,CERT(Y)
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#define handShake2 handShake1,CERT(X),{ handShake1 }sk(X),{ msecret }pk(Y), hash(msecret, handShake1, clientstring)
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/* below is just Scyther input and no further macro definitions */
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usertype Params, String;
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const pk,hash: Function;
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secret sk,unhash: Function;
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inversekeys(pk,sk);
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inversekeys(hash,unhash);
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const clientstring,serverstring: String;
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const Alice, Bob, Eve: Agent;
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const Terence: Agent;
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protocol tlsmitchell(X,Y)
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{
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role X
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{
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const Nx: Nonce;
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const msecret: Nonce;
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const pa: Params;
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var Ny: Nonce;
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var pb: Params;
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send_1( X,Y, X,Nx,pa );
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read_2( Y,X, Ny,pb,CERT(Y) );
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send_3( X,Y, CERT(X),
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{ handShake1 }sk(X),
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{ msecret }pk(Y),
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hash(msecret, handShake1, clientstring)
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);
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read_4( Y,X, hash(msecret, handShake2, serverstring) );
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claim_X1( X, Secret, msecret );
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}
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role Y
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{
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var Nx: Nonce;
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var msecret: Nonce;
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var pa: Params;
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const Ny: Nonce;
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const pb: Params;
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read_1( X,Y, X,Nx,pa );
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send_2( Y,X, Ny,pb,CERT(Y) );
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read_3( X,Y, CERT(X),
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{ handShake1 }sk(X),
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{ msecret }pk(Y),
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hash(msecret, handShake1, clientstring)
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);
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send_4( Y,X, hash(msecret, handShake2, serverstring) );
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claim_Y1( Y, Secret, msecret );
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}
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}
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untrusted Eve;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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