116 lines
2.8 KiB
Plaintext
116 lines
2.8 KiB
Plaintext
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# Lowe modified KSL
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#
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# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
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# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/kslLowe.html
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#
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# Note:
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# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
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# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a)
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#
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# Note:
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# According to SPORE there are no attacks on this protocol, scyther
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# finds one however. This has to be investigated further.
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usertype Server, SessionKey, TimeStamp, TicketKey;
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usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
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secret k: Function;
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const a, b, e: Agent;
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const s: Server;
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const Fresh: Function;
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const Compromised: Function;
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const ne: Nonce;
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const kee: SessionKey;
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untrusted e;
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compromised k(e,s);
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protocol ksl-Lowe^KeyCompromise(C)
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{
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// Read the names of 3 agents and disclose a session between them including
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// corresponding session key to simulate key compromise
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role C {
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const Ni,Nr,Nc,Ma,Mb: Nonce;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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const Kbb: TicketKey;
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const Tr: ExpiredTimeStamp;
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var I,R,S: Agent;
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read_C1(C,C, I,R,S);
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send_C2(C,C, (Ni,I),
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(Ni,I,Nr,R),
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{I,Nr,Kir}k(R,S),{Ni,R,Kir}k(I,S),
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{Tr,I,Kir}Kbb,Nc,{R,Ni}k(I,R),
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{Nc}Kir,
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Ma,
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Mb,{Ma,R}Kir,
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{I,Mb}Kir,
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Kir,
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Kbb
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);
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claim_C3(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kir));
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claim_C4(C,Empty, (Compromised,Kbb));
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}
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}
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protocol ksl-Lowe(I,R,S)
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{
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role I
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{
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const Ni, Mi: Nonce;
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var Nc, Mr: Nonce;
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var T: Ticket;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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send_1(I,R, Ni, I);
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read_4(R,I, { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S), T, Nc, {R,Ni}Kir );
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send_5(I,R, { Nc }Kir );
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send_6(I,R, Mi,T );
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read_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi, R}Kir );
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send_8(I,R, {I,Mr}Kir );
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claim_I1(I,Secret, Kir);
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claim_I2(I,Niagree);
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claim_I3(I,Nisynch);
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claim_I4(I,Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
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}
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role R
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{
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var Ni,Mi: Nonce;
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const Nr,Nc,Mr: Nonce;
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var Kir: SessionKey;
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const Kbb: TicketKey;
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const Tr: TimeStamp;
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var T: Ticket;
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read_1(I,R, Ni, I);
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send_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
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read_3(S,R, { I, Nr, Kir }k(R,S), T );
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send_4(R,I, T, { Tr, I, Kir }Kbb, Nc, {R, Ni}Kir );
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read_5(I,R, { Nc }Kir );
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read_6(I,R, Mi,{ Tr, I, Kir }Kbb );
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send_7(R,I, Mr,{Mi,R}Kir );
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read_8(I,R, {I,Mr}Kir );
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claim_R1(R,Secret, Kir);
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claim_R2(R,Niagree);
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claim_R3(R,Nisynch);
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claim_R4(R,Empty, (Fresh,Kir));
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}
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role S
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{
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var Ni, Nr: Nonce;
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const Kir: SessionKey;
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read_2(R,S, Ni, I, Nr, R );
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send_3(S,R, { I, Nr, Kir }k(R,S), { Ni,R,Kir }k(I,S) );
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}
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}
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