76 lines
1.6 KiB
Plaintext
76 lines
1.6 KiB
Plaintext
|
# Lowe modified Wide Mouthed Frog
|
||
|
|
#
|
||
|
|
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
|
||
|
|
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/wideMouthedFrogLowe.html
|
||
|
|
#
|
||
|
|
# Note:
|
||
|
|
# According to SPORE there are no known attacks on this protocol, scyther
|
||
|
|
# finds one however this has to do with the unusual assumption that every
|
||
|
|
# agent can recognise and will reject to read messages that it has created
|
||
|
|
# itself.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
usertype SessionKey;
|
||
|
|
usertype TimeStamp;
|
||
|
|
usertype ExpiredTimeStamp;
|
||
|
|
const succ,pred: Function;
|
||
|
|
inversekeys (succ,pred);
|
||
|
|
const Fresh: Function;
|
||
|
|
const Compromised: Function;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
secret k: Function;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
protocol wmf-Lowe(I,R,S)
|
||
|
|
{
|
||
|
|
role I
|
||
|
|
{
|
||
|
|
const Kir: SessionKey;
|
||
|
|
const Ti: TimeStamp;
|
||
|
|
var Kr: SessionKey;
|
||
|
|
var Nr: Nonce;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
send_1(I,S, I, {Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S));
|
||
|
|
read_3(R,I,{Nr}Kir);
|
||
|
|
send_4(I,R,{{Nr}succ}Kir);
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
claim_I1(I,Secret,Kir);
|
||
|
|
claim_I2(I,Nisynch);
|
||
|
|
claim_I3(I,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
role R
|
||
|
|
{
|
||
|
|
var Ts: TimeStamp;
|
||
|
|
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||
|
|
const Nr: Nonce;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
read_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S) );
|
||
|
|
send_3(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
|
||
|
|
read_4(I,R, {{Nr}succ}Kir);
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
claim_R1(R,Secret,Kir);
|
||
|
|
claim_R2(R,Nisynch);
|
||
|
|
claim_R3(R,Empty,(Fresh,Kir));
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
role S
|
||
|
|
{
|
||
|
|
var Kir: SessionKey;
|
||
|
|
const Ts: TimeStamp;
|
||
|
|
var Ti: TimeStamp;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
read_1(I,S, I,{Ti, R, Kir}k(I,S) );
|
||
|
|
send_2(S,R, {Ts, I, Kir}k(R,S));
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
const Alice,Bob,Eve,Simon: Agent;
|
||
|
|
const Ke: SessionKey;
|
||
|
|
const Te: TimeStamp;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
untrusted Eve;
|
||
|
|
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|