scyther/spdl/tls-paulson.cpp

#define CERT(a) { a,pk(a) }sk(Terence)
#define MSG a,na,sid,pa,pb,nb,sid,pb,CERT(a),CERT(b),{pms}pk(b) 
#define M hash(pms,na,nb)
#define F hash(M,MSG)
#define CLIENTK hash(sid,M,na,pa,a,nb,pb,b,false)
#define SERVERK hash(sid,M,na,pa,a,nb,pb,b,true)

usertype Params, Bool, SessionID;

const pk,hash: Function;
secret sk,unhash: Function;
inversekeys(pk,sk);
inversekeys(hash,unhash);

const pa,pb: Params;
const Terence: Agent;
const false,true: Bool;


protocol tlspaulson(a,b)
{
	role a
	{
		const na: Nonce;
		const sid: SessionID;
		const pms: Nonce;
		var nb: Nonce;
		var pb: Params;

		send_1( a,b, a,na,sid,pa );
		read_2( b,a, nb,sid,pb );
		read_3( b,a, CERT(b) );
		send_4( a,b, CERT(a) );
		send_5( a,b, { pms }pk(b) );
		send_6( a,b, { hash(nb,b,pms) }sk(a) );
		send_7( a,b, { F }CLIENTK );
		read_8( b,a, { F }SERVERK );

		claim_9(a, Secret,CLIENTK, SERVERK);

	}	
	
	role b
	{
		var na: Nonce;
		var sid: SessionID;
		var pms: Nonce;
		const nb: Nonce;
		const pb: Params;

		read_1( a,b, a,na,sid,pa );
		send_2( b,a, nb,sid,pb );
		send_3( b,a, CERT(b) );
		read_4( a,b, CERT(a) );
		read_5( a,b, { pms }pk(b) );
		read_6( a,b, { hash(nb,b,pms) }sk(a) );
		read_7( a,b, { F }CLIENTK );
		send_8( b,a, { F }SERVERK );

		claim_10(b, Secret,CLIENTK, SERVERK);
	}
}

const Alice, Bob, Eve: Agent;

untrusted Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);
const ne: Nonce;
const side: SessionID;
const pe: Params;

run tlspaulson.a(Agent,Agent);
run tlspaulson.b(Agent,Agent);
run tlspaulson.a(Agent,Agent);
run tlspaulson.b(Agent,Agent);
run tlspaulson.a(Agent,Agent);
run tlspaulson.b(Agent,Agent);
run tlspaulson.a(Agent,Agent);
run tlspaulson.b(Agent,Agent);