97 lines
2.0 KiB
C++
97 lines
2.0 KiB
C++
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/*
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* This is a model of the TLS version as modeled by Paulson
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*
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* Slightly modified to correspond exactly to the version in the Avispa
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* repository by Paul Hankes Drielsma.
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*
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* The .cpp file cannot be fed into scyther directly; rather, one needs
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* to type:
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*
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* cpp tls-paulson.cpp >tls-paulson.spdl
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*
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* in order to generate a valid spdl file for scyther.
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*
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* This allows for macro expansion, as seen in the next part.
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*
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*/
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#define CERT(a) { a,pk(a) }sk(Terence)
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#define MSG a,na,sid,pa,pb,nb,sid,pb,CERT(a),CERT(b),{pms}pk(b)
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#define M hash(pms,na,nb)
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#define F hash(M,MSG)
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#define CLIENTK keygen(a,na,nb,M)
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#define SERVERK keygen(b,na,nb,M)
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usertype Params, Bool, SessionID;
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const pk,hash: Function;
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secret sk,unhash: Function;
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inversekeys(pk,sk);
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inversekeys(hash,unhash);
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const keygen: Function;
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secret unkeygen: Function;
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inversekeys(keygen, unkeygen);
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const pa,pb: Params;
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const Terence: Agent;
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const false,true: Bool;
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protocol tlspaulson-avispa(a,b)
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{
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role a
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{
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const na: Nonce;
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const sid: SessionID;
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const pms: Nonce;
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var nb: Nonce;
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var pb: Params;
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send_1( a,b, a,na,sid,pa );
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read_2( b,a, nb,sid,pb );
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read_3( b,a, CERT(b) );
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send_4( a,b, CERT(a) );
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send_5( a,b, { pms }pk(b) );
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send_6( a,b, { hash(nb,b,pms) }sk(a) );
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send_7( a,b, { F }CLIENTK );
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read_8( b,a, { F }SERVERK );
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claim_9a(a, Secret, SERVERK);
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claim_9b(a, Secret, CLIENTK);
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claim_9c(a, Niagree);
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}
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role b
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{
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var na: Nonce;
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var sid: SessionID;
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var pms: Nonce;
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const nb: Nonce;
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const pb: Params;
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read_1( a,b, a,na,sid,pa );
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send_2( b,a, nb,sid,pb );
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send_3( b,a, CERT(b) );
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read_4( a,b, CERT(a) );
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read_5( a,b, { pms }pk(b) );
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read_6( a,b, { hash(nb,b,pms) }sk(a) );
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read_7( a,b, { F }CLIENTK );
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send_8( b,a, { F }SERVERK );
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claim_10a(b, Secret, SERVERK);
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claim_10b(b, Secret, CLIENTK);
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claim_10c(b, Niagree);
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}
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}
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const Alice, Bob, Eve: Agent;
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untrusted Eve;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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const ne: Nonce;
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const side: SessionID;
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const pe: Params;
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