scyther/spdl/SPORE/denning-sacco-lowe.spdl

81 lines
1.7 KiB
Plaintext
Raw Normal View History

# Lowe modified Denning-Sacco shared key
#
# Modelled after the description in the SPORE library
# http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/denningSaccoLowe.html
#
# Note:
# This protocol uses a ticket so scyther will only be able to verify
# the protocol using the ARACHNE engine (-a) and type 2 matching (-m2)
#
# Note:
# According to SPORE there are no attacks on this protocol, scyther
# finds one however. This has to be investigated further.
usertype Key;
usertype Ticket;
usertype SessionKey;
usertype TimeStamp;
secret k: Function;
usertype PseudoFunction;
const dec: PseudoFunction;
protocol denningSacco(I,R,S)
{
role I
{
var W: Ticket;
var Kir: SessionKey;
var T: TimeStamp;
var Nr: Nonce;
send_1(I,S, I,R );
read_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, W}k(I,S) );
send_3(I,R, W);
read_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
send_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
claim_6(I,Niagree);
}
role R
{
var Kir: SessionKey;
var T: TimeStamp;
const Nr: Nonce;
read_3(I,R, {Kir,I,T}k(R,S));
send_4(R,I, {Nr}Kir);
read_5(I,R, {{Nr}dec}Kir);
claim_8(R,Niagree);
}
role S
{
var W: Ticket;
const Kir: SessionKey;
const T: TimeStamp;
read_1(I,S, I,R );
send_2(S,I, {R, Kir, T, {Kir, I,T}k(R,S)}k(I,S));
}
}
const Alice,Bob,Simon,Eve: Agent;
untrusted Eve;
const kee: SessionKey;
const tee: TimeStamp;
compromised k(Eve,Simon);
# General scenario, 2 parallel runs of the protocol
# Note because the modelchecker does not support tickets this might not
# be very useful
run denningSacco.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run denningSacco.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run denningSacco.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run denningSacco.I(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run denningSacco.R(Agent,Agent,Simon);
run denningSacco.S(Agent,Agent,Simon);