75 lines
1.5 KiB
C++
75 lines
1.5 KiB
C++
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/*
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* This is a model of a version of the TLS protocol as modeled by
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* He,Sundararajan,Datta,Derek and Mitchell in the paper: "A modular
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* correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS".
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*
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* This is the fixed version, with quite some differences:
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*
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* 1) new definition of handShake1
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* 2) changed order in msg3
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*
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* (These are the suggestions made by Cas to Anupam Datta)
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*/
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#define CERT(a) { a,pk(a) }sk(Terence)
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#define msg1 X,Nx,pa
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#define msg2 Ny,pb,CERT(Y)
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#define handShake1 msg1,msg2,{msecret}pk(Y)
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#define msg3 CERT(X),{msecret}pk(Y),{handShake1}sk(X),hash(msecret,handShake1,clientstring)
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#define handShake2 msg1,msg2,msg3
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#define msg4 hash(msecret,handShake2,serverstring)
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/* below is just Scyther input and no further macro definitions */
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usertype Params, String;
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const pk,hash: Function;
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secret sk,unhash: Function;
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inversekeys(pk,sk);
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inversekeys(hash,unhash);
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const clientstring,serverstring: String;
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const Alice, Bob, Eve: Agent;
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const Terence: Agent;
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protocol tls-HSDDM05(X,Y)
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{
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role X
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{
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const Nx: Nonce;
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const msecret: Nonce;
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const pa: Params;
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var Ny: Nonce;
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var pb: Params;
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send_1( X,Y, msg1 );
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read_2( Y,X, msg2 );
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send_3( X,Y, msg3 );
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read_4( Y,X, msg4 );
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claim_X1( X, Secret, msecret );
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}
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role Y
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{
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var Nx: Nonce;
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var msecret: Nonce;
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var pa: Params;
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const Ny: Nonce;
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const pb: Params;
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read_1( X,Y, msg1 );
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send_2( Y,X, msg2 );
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read_3( X,Y, msg3 );
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send_4( Y,X, msg4 );
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claim_Y1( Y, Secret, msecret );
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}
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}
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untrusted Eve;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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