76 lines
2.2 KiB
Plaintext
76 lines
2.2 KiB
Plaintext
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/*
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* This is a model of a version of the TLS protocol as modeled by
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* He,Sundararajan,Datta,Derek and Mitchell in the paper: "A modular
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* correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS".
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*
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* This is the fixed version, with quite some differences:
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*
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* 1) new definition of handShake1 (including preceding tuples)
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* 2) new definition of both handshakes (now hashed)
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* 3) changed order in msg3 so msecret is part of handShake1
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*
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* (These are the suggestions made by Cas to Anupam Datta)
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*/
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/* below is just Scyther input and no further macro definitions */
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usertype Params, String;
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const pk,hash: Function;
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secret sk,unhash: Function;
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inversekeys(pk,sk);
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inversekeys(hash,unhash);
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const clientstring,serverstring: String;
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const Alice, Bob, Eve: Agent;
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const Terence: Agent;
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protocol tls-HSDDM05(X,Y)
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{
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role X
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{
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const Nx: Nonce;
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const msecret: Nonce;
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const pa: Params;
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var Ny: Nonce;
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var pb: Params;
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send_1( X,Y, X,Nx,pa );
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read_2( Y,X, Ny,pb,{ Y,pk(Y) }sk(Terence) );
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send_3( X,Y, { X,pk(X) }sk(Terence),{msecret}pk(Y),{hash(X,Nx,pa,Ny,pb,{ Y,pk(Y) }sk(Terence),{msecret}pk(Y))}sk(X),hash(msecret,hash(X,Nx,pa,Ny,pb,{ Y,pk(Y) }sk(Terence),{msecret}pk(Y)),clientstring) );
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read_4( Y,X, hash(msecret,hash(X,Nx,pa,Ny,pb,{ Y,pk(Y) }sk(Terence),{ X,pk(X) }sk(Terence),{msecret}pk(Y),{hash(X,Nx,pa,Ny,pb,{ Y,pk(Y) }sk(Terence),{msecret}pk(Y))}sk(X),hash(msecret,hash(X,Nx,pa,Ny,pb,{ Y,pk(Y) }sk(Terence),{msecret}pk(Y)),clientstring)),serverstring) );
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claim_X1( X, Secret, msecret );
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}
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role Y
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{
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var Nx: Nonce;
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var msecret: Nonce;
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var pa: Params;
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const Ny: Nonce;
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const pb: Params;
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read_1( X,Y, X,Nx,pa );
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send_2( Y,X, Ny,pb,{ Y,pk(Y) }sk(Terence) );
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read_3( X,Y, { X,pk(X) }sk(Terence),{msecret}pk(Y),{hash(X,Nx,pa,Ny,pb,{ Y,pk(Y) }sk(Terence),{msecret}pk(Y))}sk(X),hash(msecret,hash(X,Nx,pa,Ny,pb,{ Y,pk(Y) }sk(Terence),{msecret}pk(Y)),clientstring) );
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send_4( Y,X, hash(msecret,hash(X,Nx,pa,Ny,pb,{ Y,pk(Y) }sk(Terence),{ X,pk(X) }sk(Terence),{msecret}pk(Y),{hash(X,Nx,pa,Ny,pb,{ Y,pk(Y) }sk(Terence),{msecret}pk(Y))}sk(X),hash(msecret,hash(X,Nx,pa,Ny,pb,{ Y,pk(Y) }sk(Terence),{msecret}pk(Y)),clientstring)),serverstring) );
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claim_Y1( Y, Secret, msecret );
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}
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}
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untrusted Eve;
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compromised sk(Eve);
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