139 lines
3.4 KiB
C++
139 lines
3.4 KiB
C++
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/**********************************************************************
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* @protocol Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2)
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* @subprotocol IKE EAP
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* @reference RFC 4306
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* @variant Excludes optional payloads
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**********************************************************************/
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/**
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* Modeling notes:
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* - It's not clear what to put in the EAP payloads; we now model them
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* as nonces, but maybe it is better to view them as a function of the
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* actor.
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*/
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/**
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* MACRO DEFINITIONS
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* Needs preprocessing by cpp before fed to scyther
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*/
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#define __IKEV2__
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#ifndef __ORACLE__
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#include "common.h"
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#endif
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#define AUTHii {SPIi, O, SA1, g(i), Ni, Nr, prf(SKi, I)}sk(I)
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#define AUTHir {SPIi, O, SA1, Gi, Ni, Nr, prf(SKr, I)}sk(I)
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#define AUTHri {SPIi, SPIr, SA1, Gr, Nr, Ni, prf(SKi, R)}sk(R)
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#define AUTHrr {SPIi, SPIr, SA1, g(r), Nr, Ni, prf(SKr, R)}sk(R)
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usertype Number, SecurityAssociation, TrafficSelector;
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const O: Number;
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const SA1 ,SA2, SA3: SecurityAssociation;
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const TSi, TSr: TrafficSelector;
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/**
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* This role serves as an "oracle" to ensure the executability of the
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* protocol by taking care of the problems that arise from our way of
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* modelling Diffie-Hellman keys.
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*/
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protocol @executability(E) {
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#define Gi g(i)
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#define Gr g(r)
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role E {
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var i, r, Ni, Nr, SPIi, SPIr, EAP, EAPOK: Nonce;
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var I, R: Agent;
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// msg 3
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recv_!E1( E, E, {I, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
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send_!E2( E, E, {I, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
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// msg 4
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recv_!E3( E, E, {R, AUTHrr, EAP}SKr );
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send_!E4( E, E, {R, AUTHri, EAP}SKi );
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// msg 5
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recv_!E5( E, E, {EAP}SKi );
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send_!E6( E, E, {EAP}SKr );
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// msg 6
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recv_!E7( E, E, {EAPOK}SKr );
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send_!E8( E, E, {EAPOK}SKi );
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// msg 7
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recv_!E9( E, E, {AUTHii}SKi );
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send_!EA( E, E, {AUTHir}SKr );
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// msg 8
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send_!EB( E, E, {AUTHrr, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
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send_!EC( E, E, {AUTHri, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
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}
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#undef Gi
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#undef Gr
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}
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protocol ikev2-eap2(I, R)
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{
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role I {
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fresh i, Ni, SPIi: Nonce;
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var Nr, SPIr: Nonce;
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var EAP, EAPOK: Nonce;
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var Gr: Ticket;
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/* IKE_SA_INIT */
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send_1( I, R, SPIi, O, SA1, g(i), Ni );
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recv_2( R, I, HDR, SA1, Gr, Nr );
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/* IKE_AUTH */
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send_!3( I, R, HDR, {I, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
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recv_!4( R, I, HDR, {R, AUTHri, EAP}SKi );
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send_!5( I, R, HDR, {EAP}SKi );
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recv_!6( R, I, HDR, {EAPOK}SKi );
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claim( I, Running, R, Ni,g(i),Nr,Gr,TSi,TSr,EAP,EAPOK );
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send_!7( I, R, HDR, {AUTHii}SKi );
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recv_!8( R, I, HDR, {AUTHri, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKi );
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/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
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claim( I, SKR, SKi );
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claim( I, Alive );
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claim( I, Weakagree );
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claim( I, Commit, R, Ni,g(i),Nr,Gr,TSi,TSr,EAP,EAPOK );
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}
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role R {
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fresh EAP, EAPOK: Nonce;
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fresh r, Nr, SPIr: Nonce;
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var Ni, SPIi: Nonce;
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var Gi: Ticket;
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/* IKE_SA_INIT */
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recv_1( I, R, SPIi, O, SA1, Gi, Ni );
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send_2( R, I, HDR, SA1, g(r), Nr );
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/* IKE_AUTH */
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recv_!3( I, R, HDR, {I, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
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send_!4( R, I, HDR, {R, AUTHrr, EAP}SKr );
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recv_!5( I, R, HDR, {EAP}SKr );
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send_!6( R, I, HDR, {EAPOK}SKr );
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recv_!7( I, R, HDR, {AUTHir}SKr );
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claim( R, Running, I, Ni,Gi,Nr,g(r),TSi,TSr,EAP,EAPOK );
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send_!8( R, I, HDR, {AUTHrr, SA2, TSi, TSr}SKr );
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/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
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claim( R, SKR, SKr );
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claim( R, Alive );
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claim( R, Weakagree );
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claim( R, Commit, I, Ni,Gi,Nr,g(r),TSi,TSr,EAP,EAPOK );
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}
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}
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