88 lines
2.0 KiB
C++
88 lines
2.0 KiB
C++
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/**********************************************************************
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* @protocol Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2)
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* @subprotocol IKE Create Child SA
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* @reference RFC 4306
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* @variant Supports perfect forward secrecy
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**********************************************************************/
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/**
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* MACRO DEFINITIONS
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* Needs preprocessing by cpp before fed to scyther
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*/
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#define __IKEV2_CHILD__
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#ifndef __ORACLE__
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#include "common.h"
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#endif
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usertype SecurityAssociation;
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const SA1 ,SA2, SA3: SecurityAssociation;
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/**
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* This role serves as an "oracle" to ensure the executability of the
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* protocol by taking care of the problems that arise from our way of
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* modelling k(I,R) = k(R,I).
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*/
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protocol @executability(O) {
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#define Gi g(i)
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#define Gr g(r)
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role O {
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var i, r, Ni, Nr: Nonce;
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var I, R: Agent;
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// msg 1
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recv_!O1( O, O, {SA3, Ni, g(i)}k(I,R) );
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send_!O2( O, O, {SA3, Ni, g(i)}k(R,I) );
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// msg 2
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recv_!O3( O, O, {SA3, Nr, Gr}k(R,I) );
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send_!O4( O, O, {SA3, Nr, Gr}k(I,R) );
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}
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#undef Gi
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#undef Gr
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}
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// Note: SPIs not modeled as they would lead to trivial attacks where the adversary
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// tampers with the SPIs (they are not subsequently authenticated)
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protocol ikev2-child(I, R)
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{
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role I {
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fresh i, Ni: Nonce;
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var Nr: Nonce;
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var Gr: Ticket;
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/* IKE_SA_INIT */
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claim( I, Running, R,Ni,g(i) );
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send_!1( I, R, {SA3, Ni, g(i)}k(I,R) );
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recv_!2( R, I, {SA3, Nr, Gr}k(I,R) );
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/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
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claim( I, SKR, SKi );
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claim( I, Alive );
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claim( I, Weakagree );
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claim( I, Commit, R,Ni,g(i),Nr,Gr );
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}
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role R {
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fresh r, Nr: Nonce;
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var Ni: Nonce;
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var Gi: Ticket;
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recv_!1( I, R, {SA3, Ni, Gi}k(R,I) );
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claim( R, Running, I,Ni,Gi,Nr,g(r) );
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send_!2( R, I, {SA3, Nr, g(r)}k(R,I) );
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/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
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claim( R, SKR, SKr );
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claim( R, Alive );
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claim( R, Weakagree );
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claim( R, Commit, I,Ni,Gi );
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}
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}
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