scyther/spdl/misc/tls-HSDDM05.cpp

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/*
* This is a model of a version of the TLS protocol as modeled by
* He,Sundararajan,Datta,Derek and Mitchell in the paper: "A modular
* correctness proof of IEEE 802.11i and TLS".
*
* The .cpp file cannot be fed into scyther directly; rather, one needs
* to type: (for *nix type systems with cpp)
*
* cpp tls-HSDDM05.cpp >tls-HSDDM05.spdl
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*
* in order to generate a valid spdl file for the Scyther.
*
* This allows for macro expansion, as seen in the next part, which is
* particularly useful for expanding the handshakes.
*
*/
#define CERT(a) { a,pk(a) }sk(Terence)
#define msg1 X,Nx,pa
#define msg2 Ny,pb,CERT(Y)
#define handShake1 msg1,msg2
#define msg3 CERT(X),{handShake1}sk(X),{msecret}pk(Y),hash(msecret,handShake1,clientstring)
#define handShake2 msg1,msg2,msg3
#define msg4 hash(msecret,handShake2,serverstring)
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/* below is just Scyther input and no further macro definitions */
usertype Params, String;
const pk,hash: Function;
secret sk,unhash: Function;
inversekeys(pk,sk);
inversekeys(hash,unhash);
const clientstring,serverstring: String;
const Alice, Bob, Eve: Agent;
const Terence: Agent;
protocol tls-HSDDM05(X,Y)
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{
role X
{
const Nx: Nonce;
const msecret: Nonce;
const pa: Params;
var Ny: Nonce;
var pb: Params;
send_1( X,Y, msg1 );
read_2( Y,X, msg2 );
send_3( X,Y, msg3 );
read_4( Y,X, msg4 );
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claim_X1( X, Secret, msecret );
}
role Y
{
var Nx: Nonce;
var msecret: Nonce;
var pa: Params;
const Ny: Nonce;
const pb: Params;
read_1( X,Y, msg1 );
send_2( Y,X, msg2 );
read_3( X,Y, msg3 );
send_4( Y,X, msg4 );
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claim_Y1( Y, Secret, msecret );
}
}
untrusted Eve;
compromised sk(Eve);