101 lines
2.5 KiB
C++
101 lines
2.5 KiB
C++
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/**********************************************************************
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* @protocol Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv1)
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* @reference RFC 2409,
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* Boyd C. and Mathuria A., Protocols for Authentication
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* and Key Agreement
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* @variant Digital signature authentication (aggressive mode) with
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* a modification suggested by Perlman et al.
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**********************************************************************/
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/**
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* MACRO DEFINITIONS
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* Needs preprocessing by cpp before fed to scyther
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*/
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#define __IKEV1__
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#ifndef __ORACLE__
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#include "common.h"
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#endif
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#define SKEYIDi prf(Ni,Nr,Zi)
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#define SKEYIDr prf(Ni,Nr,Zr)
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#define HASH_Ii prf(Ni, Nr, Zi, g(i), Gr, Ci, Cr, list, I)
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#define HASH_Ir prf(Ni, Nr, Zr, Gi, g(r), Ci, Cr, list, I)
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#define HASH_Ri prf(Ni, Nr, Zi, Gr, g(i), Cr, Ci, list, R)
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#define HASH_Rr prf(Ni, Nr, Zr, g(r), Gi, Cr, Ci, list, R)
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usertype String;
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const list, algo: String;
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/**
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* This role serves as an "oracle" to ensure the executability of the
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* protocol by taking care of the problems that arise from our way of
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* modelling Diffie-Hellman keys.
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*/
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protocol @executability(O) {
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#define Gi g(i)
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#define Gr g(r)
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role O {
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var i, r, Ni, Nr, Ci, Cr: Nonce;
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var I, R: Agent;
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// msg 4
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recv_!O1( O, O, {R, {HASH_Rr}sk(R)}SKr );
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send_!O2( O, O, {R, {HASH_Ri}sk(R)}SKi );
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// msg 5
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recv_!O3( O, O, {I, {HASH_Ii}sk(I)}SKi );
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send_!O4( O, O, {I, {HASH_Ir}sk(I)}SKr );
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}
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#undef Gi
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#undef Gr
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}
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protocol ikev1-sig-m-perlman(I, R)
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{
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role I {
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fresh i, Ni, Ci: Nonce;
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var Nr, Cr: Nonce;
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var Gr: Ticket;
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send_1( I, R, Ci, list );
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recv_2( R, I, Ci, Cr, algo );
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send_3( I, R, Ci, Cr, g(i), Ni );
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recv_!4( R, I, Ci, Cr, Gr, Nr, {R, {HASH_Ri}sk(R)}SKi );
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claim( I, Running, R, Ni, Nr, g(i), Gr, Ci, Cr );
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send_!5( I, R, Ci, Cr, {I, {HASH_Ii}sk(I)}SKi );
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/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
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claim( I, SKR, SKi );
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claim( I, Alive );
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claim( I, Weakagree );
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claim( I, Commit, R, Ni, Nr, g(i), Gr, Ci, Cr );
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}
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role R {
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fresh r, Nr, Cr: Nonce;
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var Ni, Ci: Nonce;
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var Gi: Ticket;
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recv_1( I, R, Ci, list );
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send_2( R, I, Ci, Cr, algo );
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recv_3( I, R, Ci, Cr, Gi, Ni );
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claim( R, Running, I, Ni, Nr, Gi, g(r), Ci, Cr );
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send_!4( R, I, Ci, Cr, g(r), Nr, {R, {HASH_Rr}sk(R)}SKr );
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recv_!5( I, R, Ci, Cr, {I, {HASH_Ir}sk(I)}SKr );
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/* SECURITY CLAIMS */
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claim( R, SKR, SKr );
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claim( R, Alive );
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claim( R, Weakagree );
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claim( R, Commit, I, Ni, Nr, Gi, g(r), Ci, Cr );
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}
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}
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